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ABSTRACT 
Dynamic Reliability Using Entry-time Approach for  
Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants. (May 2008) 
Shuwen Wang, B.S., Shanghai Jiao Tong University; 
M.E., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Paul Nelson 
 
Entry-time processes are finite-state continuous-time jump processes with transition 
rates depending only on the two states involved in transition, the calendar time, and the 
most recent arrival time, which is termed as entry-time.  
The entry-time processes have the potential to provide a significantly greater range 
of applicability and flexibility than traditional reliability tools for case studies related to 
equipment and components in nuclear power plants. 
In this dissertation, the finite difference approximation of the integrodifferential 
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations for the entry-time processes was developed, and then it 
was verified by application to some hypothetical examples that are solved by alternative 
means, either (semi-)analytically or via simulation.  
To demonstrate the ability of entry-time model to applications in nuclear power 
plants for a RIAM based scenario, the entry-time approach is applied to the maintenance 
of main generators in nuclear power using the data from INPO-EPIX database. In this 
application, both reliability and financial performances acquired using the entry-time 
  iv 
approaches corresponding to different maintenance policies are presented and discussed 
to help make maintenance decisions for the plant management. 
The ability of the EPIX database to provide time-dependent failure rates is 
demonstrated and the techniques for extraction of failure rates from the database for 
main generators are also discussed.  
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 The objective of the research underlying this dissertation was to develop, assess 
and demonstrate applicability of a novel reliability methodology, centered about what 
we term as “entry-time processes,” that has the potential to provide a significantly 
greater range of applicability and flexibility than traditional reliability tools for case 
studies related to equipment and components in nuclear power plants. 
The essential idea of the entry-time methodology is to expand traditional finite-state 
Markov models, whose application to equipment reliability and maintenance issues for 
nuclear power plants is well known [1], by appending “entry time” (the time at which 
the system entered its present finite state) as an additional continuous state variable. This 
extension permits reliability issues for equipment having time-dependent failure rates, or 
more generally time-dependent transition rates between arbitrarily defined finite states, 
to be treated via Markov models.  See Chapter II below for further details. 
The inclusion of entry time as a state variable leads to Chapman-Kolmogorov 
equations that have an integrodifferential form (cf. also Chapter II below), in contrast to 
the linear system of ordinary differential equations that constitute the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equations for a finite-state Markov model.  It is well known (e.g., [2]) that 
the neutron transport equation is also an instance of such an integrodifferential 
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation.  In recognition of this analogy, we propose here to 
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solve the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations in the reliability application by adapting 
discrete algorithms of the type widely employed in neutron transport theory (cf. Chapter 
III below).  By contrast, DeVooght and Smidts [3] employed Monte Carlo methods for 
the solution of their prototypical state-transition equations when modeling safety-related 
considerations in nuclear power plants. The entry-time process is flexible in definition of 
states, i.e. the definition of states can be changed according to different modeling 
requirements. Last, but not least, the capability of allowing tracking of probabilities of 
“intermediate” events (e.g. states of a given system other than “failure” and “running”) 
can help to make management decisions on preventive and corrective maintenance, and 
to develop systematic policies related to enhancement of system or component reliability. 
The entry-time methodology has particular potential for incorporation into case 
studies supporting plant planning, and related case studies, including such matters as the 
effects of component aging and the scheduling of inspections, tests and planned 
preventive maintenance activities. This potential is demonstrated in Chapter V below, in 
application to an economically significant reactor subsystem, here selected as the main 
generator system.  The potential for this sort of application can only be further enhanced 
by obtaining improved estimates of equipment failure rates through first-principles 
consideration of the underlying causes of failure.  Nonetheless, extraction of failure rates 
from limited amounts of data, for specific systems, structures and components (SSCs), 
appears likely, for the foreseeable future, to be one of the more difficult aspects of 
applying any methodology for quantitatively analyzing equipment reliability issues.  In 
this dissertation these issues are treated in Chapter IV. 
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In a speech given by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman Dale E. 
Klein, it mentions that “…In fact, I think it can be safely said that the Nuclear 
Renaissance has officially begun …[4]”. With the fast growing nuclear business and 
developing nuclear technology, nuclear energy has been more competitive comparing to 
coal and gas energy. While many factors have contributed to this competitive resurgence 
of nuclear energy, two of the central causes are a remarkable improvement in unit 
capacity factors and a significant trend toward power upratings [5]. Many changes in the 
overall economic/regulatory setting have provided the motivation for these industry-
wide changes, and many improvements in industry practice have contributed to their 
enablement. The general philosophy underlying these improvements is a proactive 
approach to simultaneous and objective consideration of both financial and engineering 
factors so as to support management decisions directed toward increasing overall energy 
output while ensuring plant safety. This philosophical approach has become symbolized 
by the term “asset management.” As such it is embodied in the RIAM (Risk-informed 
Asset Management) concept [6] that has been aggressively pursued by STPNOC (South 
Texas Plant Nuclear Operating Company), the complementary NAM (Nuclear 
Asset/Risk Management) program [7] of EPRI, and the Nuclear Asset Management task 
force of the Nuclear Electric Institute (NEI). As one of the important parts of the RIAM 
programs, Life Cycle Management (LCM) is becoming the standard to measure plant 
excellence [8]. In the report prepared by Gregor and Chockie (also see [8]), different 
aging management programs including LCM are summarized. Among all the programs, 
EPRI developed Aging Management Tools for mechanical and structural equipment to 
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provide guidance to the plant licensees; also EPRI initiated the Preventive Maintenance 
(PM) project to develop an industry consensus of best practices for maintenance and 
aging management. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) led the 
development of an equipment reliability guide (AP-913) that incorporated the PM basis, 
LCM and Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) programs. Other similar research 
has been done in US Department of Energy (DOE) and NRC. In particular, NRC has 
done some License Renewal (LR) research to investigate the aging degradation of 
safety-related equipments and later the safety requirements for LR were made mandatory 
requirements as part of the regulations. The relationship of various industry and NRC 
programs is shown in Figure 1 [8].   
Asset management has been identified, in the context of nuclear power, as the 
practice of resource allocation and risk management at all levels of an electricity-
generating company to create maximum value and profitability to stakeholders. Liming 
and Grantom (see also [6]) define risk-informed asset management as follows: “RIAM is 
a process by which analysts review historical performance and develop logic models and 
data analyses to predict critical decision support figures-of-merit (or metrics) for 
generating station managers and electric utility company objectives. These metrics 
include, but are not limited to: profitability, projected revenue, projected costs, asset 
value, safety, power production availability, efficiency and others. These authors 
continue to clarify that RIAM “complements and integrates existing activities like PRA, 
preventive maintenance optimization (PMO), life cycle management (LCM), and nuclear 
asset management (NAM) methodologies.” The importance of proactively managing 
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plant assets can only be increased by the current NRC movement away from traditional 




Figure 1. The relationship of aging management programs [8] 
 
In the current nuclear industry, a lot of effort (as summarized in [10]) has been put 
into the development of applicable models that can be used to enhance power-plant 
performance, such as increasing power output, or decreasing cost while still meeting the 
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required safety objective. EPRI and its user group are building new Generation Risk 
Assessment (GRA) [11] models based on the existing PRA models.  GRA models 
provide a systematic approach to estimating how equipment reliability relates to the risk 
of future lost generation from trips and derates and to prioritizing components and 
systems based on their importance to productivity. Others such as the reliability group at 
Comanche Peak nuclear power plant are doing some SPV (Single Point Vulnerability) 
analysis to all the key components in nuclear systems so that they can focus on 
increasing the reliability performance of those key components in order to optimize 
nuclear-power-plant safety/economic performance. No matter what methods or models 
are used, they have the same goal, which is simultaneous and objective consideration of 
both financial and engineering factors so as to support management decisions directed 
toward increasing overall energy output while ensuring plant safety. 
The above applications tend generically to fall within the area of reliability and 
maintenance. Within the general area of reliability and maintenance, such practices as 
proactive in-service inspection, testing and preventive maintenance of plant components 
and subsystems, of course with due regard for safety-based regulatory constraints, have 
played a major role in the industry-wide performance improvements cited in the 
preceding section. The importance of in-service inspection, testing and preventive 
maintenance can only be increased by the current Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) movement away from traditional prescriptive regulations, in favor of 
performance-based implementation of risk-based regulations. 
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Many of the generic applications have motivated some of the developments of asset 
management techniques and tools for nuclear applications, and in turn have been the 
subject of applications of these techniques and tools. However, almost all the current 
applications are based on constant failure rate assumptions, which arises problems when 
dealing with aging and degradation phenomena in safety-significant nuclear power plant 
equipments [12]. Therefore, it’s important to find new approaches in Nuclear Asset 
Management (NAM) and Risk-informed Asset Management (RIAM) which can not only 
meet the risk-based requirement but also solve the aging and degradation phenomena 
which normally bring time-dependent failure rates or transition rates. The proposed 
methodology “entry-time process” will give a new approach in the application of risk-
based nuclear asset management.  On the one hand, the entry-time process solves the 
time-dependent transition rates related problems in the current Nuclear Asset 
Management (NAM) and Risk-informed Asset Management (RIAM) applications. On 
the other hand, this process can support management decisions directed toward 
increasing overall reliability while still meeting the economic demands in order to 
maximize the plant output and minimizing costs related to maintenance and plant 
enhancement. Also it may provide a new methodology for applications in PRA and GRA 
in nuclear power plants to include time-dependent features based on the existing models. 
In the past two decades, a number of methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA), Markov models (cf. [1]), simulation [13] and other methods for risk assessment 
of dynamic systems [14] have been used to evaluate SSC (System, Structure and 
Component) reliability in NPP (Nuclear Power Plants) to ensure NPP safety. Among all 
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these models, PRA model is one of the most popular models that are being used in 
nuclear industry. However, the assumption of constant failure rates in the PRA model 
has restricted the application of this model at a certain level [15]. It has been proved that 
aging is an important factor in NPP component failure such as piping system rapture 
[16]. It is clear that failure due to aging is not constant; rather, by definition aging is the 
phenomena of a failure rate that increases with time, at least until further actions such as 
repair or replacement are taken. To solve this problem, we need to find a new 
methodology that incorporates aging effects and maintenance policies into the existing 
PRA model and further with the new GRA model, which are on the current forefront of 
developments in the nuclear industry, to achieve better results for system reliability/risk 
assessment and to support management decisions directed toward increasing overall 
energy output while ensuring plant safety objectives continue to be met. There are some 
jobs done (such as [17]) to incorporate aging effects into PRA, similarly, the dynamic 
reliability parameters generated by the entry-time approach at the system level can be 
used as input to the static PRA and GRA models to incorporate preventive maintenance 
policies and aging affects. 
In this dissertation, the objective of developing, verifying and applying the entry-
time approach is accomplished as follows: In Chapter II the entry-time model is defined, 
the corresponding integrodifferential Chapman-Kolmogorov equations are developed, 
and a discrete algorithm for their solution is developed. In Chapter III the discrete 
algorithm is verified by application to some hypothetical examples that are solved by 
alternative means, either (semi-)analytically or via simulation. After that, the entry-time 
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approach is applied to a real filed NPP application in a RIAM based scenario using the 
data from INPO-EPIX database followed by possible applications of the entry-time 
approach to PRA and GRA model in NPP in Chapter V. Also the applicability of the 
EPIX database is proved in Chapter IV. More specifically, in Chapter IV the time-
dependent failure rates, i.e. aging effects are extracted from the EPIX database for some 
general components such as rotors and circuit breakers to show the applicability of the 
database in aging analysis, then the time-dependent failure rates for the main generator 
system are extracted using different schemes for the application in Chapter V. Chapter V 
mainly focuses on the application of the entry-time model to maintenance of the main 
generator system in nuclear power plants. In this chapter, both the reliability 
performance and the financial performance of the system are analyzed based on different 
preventive maintenance policies. Also possible applications of the entry-time approach 
to PRA and GRA model in NPP is given at the end of this chapter. 




The primary objective of this chapter is to establish the basics of entry-time 
processes, and of one approach to their computational use in modeling reliability issues.  
In Section 2.1 we outline the fundamentals of entry-time processes, as a particular type 
of stochastic process. This culminates in the generalized state-transition equations 
(Equations (8) and (9) below), whose computational solution is the essence of the novel 
methodology proposed and developed in this dissertation.  A particular discrete 
algorithm for the computational solution of the generalized state-transition equations is 
outlined in Section 2.2.  This algorithm will provide the basis for much of the subsequent 
usage of entry-time models to study reliability issues in nuclear power plants.  
2.1 Fundamentals 
The treatment of this section is intended to follow the traditions of stochastic 
processes, as viewed within the field of applied probability.  See [18] and [19] for 
examples of the fundamentals of stochastic processes, as so viewed. 
Given a simple marked point process [20], the entry time associated to calendar time 
t is defined as the most recent arrival time; symbolically ( )( ) N ttτ τ= , where N is the 
associated counting process. The mark values will commonly be referred to as “states”, 
and denoted by “k”. 
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Definition:  An entry-time process is a random marked point process : ,Ψ Ω → M  
where Ω is the underlying probability space, M is the space of all simple marked point 
processes having some fixed finite mark space, say K=1:I, and the rates ( , )ij tλ τ  of 
transition from mark j to mark i are specified as a function of calendar time t and entry 
time τ :=τ(t) ≤ t.  Here the entry time is the time at which the process attained mark j, 
given that it has that mark at calendar time t.  
In the application to reliability the value of the associated mark, at calendar time t, is 
some characterization of the state of the equipment of interest, in terms of its 
functionality at that time.  Henceforth we will therefore use the term “state” rather than 
“mark.”   
An entry-time process is not a finite-state Markov process, because of the 
dependence of the transition rates on the entry time (generically denoted here asτ ), 
which is no later than the calendar time (t).  If one augments the state space by the entry 
time, there results a Semi-Markov process, with associated Chapman-Kolmogorov 
equations [21 ], termed here as generalized state-transition equations.  We now wish to 
develop those equations, in some detail. 
Given an entry-time process, we take as our immediate objective to find a 
determined system of equations whose solution would provide the time-dependent state 
probabilities, 
 { }( )( ) : Pr ,  for all 1:  and 0,i N tP t k i i I t= = ∈ >  (1) 
from the known transition rates, and a known initial distribution of states, say 
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{ } (0)0(0) : Pr , 1: .i iP k i P i I= = = ∈  (2) 
Our approach does not (immediately) lead to a set of determined equations in which 
the state probabilities appear per se as the unknown dependent variable.  Rather that role 
is played by the entry-time state probabilities, 
 
{ } { }(1) ( )( ) : Pr ( ) ( )i N tP t N t N k iτ τ , = = ∩ =   (3)  
However, note that (1) (1)( ) ( , )i iP t P t t=  so that (approximations to) the entry-time state 
probabilities entail approximations to the state probabilities. 
In the following we first obtain the integrodifferential state-transition equations on 
the basis of the assumption that the transition rates are known.  Then we observe that 
these integrodifferential equations can be reinterpreted to permit the concept of more 
general (e.g., time-certain) transitions. 
Let 0≤τ ≤ t. Then (1) ( , )iP tτ  is the probability that at (calendar) time t the system had 
entry time occurring on or before τ, with associated state i. This happens if and only if at 
time t the entry time is either 0 or some τ’, 0<τ’≤τ.  The probability of the former is 
(1) (0, ).iP t  The latter happens if and only if the system transitions into state i at or prior to τ, 
and does not subsequently transition out at or prior to time t.  If 0<τ’’<τ’, then the 
probability that at time τ’ the system has entry time in dτ’’ at τ’’, with associated mark j, 
is (1)1 ( ', ') ' ( ').jD P d o dτ τ τ τ+  (Here, and throughout, iD denotes the partial derivative with 
respect to the ith argument, while “o” and “O” respectively denote quantities that 
approach zero fast than or no slower than their arguments.)  Given this, the probability 
that a transition to state i occurs during dτ’ at τ’ is λij(τ’’, τ’) dτ’ + o(dτ’).  Thus the 
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probability of a transition from state j with entry time in dτ’’ at τ’’ to state i with entry 
time in dτ’ at τ’ is 
(1)
1 ( ', ') ( ', ') ' ' ( ') ( ') ( ') ( ').j ijD P d d o d O d o d O dτ τ λ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ+ +
 
If we now sum over all states j, and pass to the limiting integral in the usual fashion, 





1 10 0 0
( , ) ( ', ') ( ', ') ' ' (0, ') (0, ') '
I I
i ij j ij j
j j
N t D P d d P d
τ τ τ
τ λ τ τ τ τ τ τ λ τ τ τ+
= =
= +    (4) 
as the relative frequency of transitions into state i with associated entry times τ ≤ t.  Here 
the last term is the contribution due to transitions from systems in their initial state, and 
therefore not included in the transitions counted within the double integral. 
To obtain the net contribution of such transitions to (1) ( , )iP tτ  it is necessary to 
subtract the relative frequency of transitions into state i that occur after time 0 and at or 
prior to time τ and that are followed by subsequent transitions that occur at or prior to 





1 10 ' 0 0
( , ) ( ', ') ( ', ') ' ' ( ', ') ( ', ') ' '.
t tI I
i ji i ji i
j j
N t D P d d D P d d
τ ,ττ
τ
τ λ τ τ τ τ τ τ λ τ τ τ τ τ τ−
= =
= =     (5) 
If we combine all of these results, we then obtain 
 




(1) (1) (1) (1)
1





( , ) (0, ) ( ', ') ( ', ') ' ' (0, ') (0, ') '
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The (initial form of) the integrodifferential equations we are seeking are obtained by 
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Equations (8) and (9) are the desired initial form of the integrodifferential equation.  
Now we generalize these by noting that the integrals on the right-hand side can be 
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where the integrators are the (nonnegative and nonincreasing in τ) cumulative transition 
functions 
( , ) ( ', ) '.
t
ij ijt t d
τ
τ λ τ τΛ = 
 
Interpretation of these integrators is discussed below, but now we focus on the use 
of them to incorporate delta functions in the transition rates, through (positive) jump 
discontinuities in the integrators.  However, then the integrals on the right-hand sides of 
these equations need not exist, in the Riemann-Stieltjes sense.  We finesse this issue as 
follows.  First, we assume that for any fixed t, each integrator has at most finitely many 
discontinuities inτ, say { } { }( ) ,k k tτ τ=  for each fixed t.  Then we compute a typical 
integral in  (10) or (11) by summing over the intervals of continuity; e.g., 
 
(1) (1)
1 ' 1 '
0
( ', ) ( ', ) ( ', ) ( ', ).
k
k
i ji i ji
k




τ τ τ τΛ = Λ   (12) 
We then assume that for each fixed t the derivatives are piecewise continuous in τ, 
with only simple jump discontinuities, and interpret the values of these derivatives at the 
endpoints of each of the integrals on the right as the limits from the interior of the 
interval.  Finally, we normalize the integrators by the assumption that they are 
continuous from the right in τ.  With these conventions the integrands and integrators on 
the right-hand side of Equation (12) never have a simultaneous discontinuity, so each of 
these constituent integrals is well-defined in the Riemann-Stieltjes sense.  As the net 
effect of all of these conventions is to evaluate delta-function (i.e., atomic) contributions 
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to the transition rates as the left limit of the integrand, we shall term them collectively as 
the left-atomic convention. 
 This convention permits incorporation of policies that can be represented as time-
certain events in the entry or sojourn times.  (For example, systems incorporated before 
the year 2000 will be immediately replaced, or systems will be replaced once they reach 
five years of age.)   Time-certain events in calendar time or that affect the initial 
distribution of states can similarly be incorporated on an ad hoc basis.  It would be of 
some interest to develop an even further generalized version of Equations (10) or (11) 
that formally incorporates all of these possibilities; however, that is outside the scope of 
the present work. 
 Note that if the transition rates depend only on the sojourn time, then they are 
given by 
'1






f t f t
t t
S tF t









where ( )ijf s  is the probability density function for transitions from state j to state i at 
sojourn time s, and 
'
'10
( ) : ( ') ',  ( ) : 1 ( ).
s I
ij ij j i j
i
F s f s ds S s F s
=
= = −  
are respectively the cumulative transition probability from state j to state i after sojourn 
time s, and the survival probability in state j after sojourn time s.  In this case, the 
cumulative transition functions satisfy 
   
17 
'1




















In the case that only one fij is nonzero, with say i and j respectively representing 
failed and operating states, the preceding integral can be evaluated as 
[ ]( , ) ln 1 ( ) ( ),ij t F t H tΛ τ τ τ= − − − = −  
where ( ) ( )ijF s F s= is the cumulative probability of failure prior to sojourn time s, and  
( ) : - ln  ( ) - ln  ( )ijH s S s S s= =
 
is often termed as the cumulative hazard function.  In this context the survival function 
S(s) is commonly termed reliability function, and denoted R(s). 
 The cumulative transition functions Λij are thus a generalization, to multistate 
competing-process stochastic models, of the common hazard function.  While the 
cumulative transition functions are nonnegative, they are not probabilities, hence need 
not be bounded above by one.  They share this property with the transition rates and 
probability density functions, in contrast to the cumulative transition probabilities, 
survival probabilities and reliabilities.   
2.2 Discrete Algorithm 
In this section we develop a finite-difference methodology for approximate solution 
of the generalized state transition Equations (10) and (11) of the preceding section. 
Figure 2 depicts the first quadrant of the (τ, t,)-plane. The Pi(τ, t) are sought in the 
relevant region t >τ , overlaid by a mesh of square cells of dimension ∆t × ∆t, for some 
positive value of ∆t.   We use m and n respectively as discrete surrogates for τ and t, τm 
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=m∆t and tn=n∆t.  The objective is to obtain computational approximations 
( , ) ( , ).m ni iP P m t n t≈ ∆ ∆   We use the notations 
{ }1 1( , ) : , ,mn m m n nC t t t tτ τ τ τ + += ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
 for m≤n, and { }( , ) : .n nnT C t tτ τ= ≥  
 
Figure 2. The computational grid for entry-time process 
 
We begin by evaluating Equation (10) at τm=m∆t, and then integrating the resulting 
equation on t, from t=tn to t=tn+1, for some n>m.  The result is 
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Equations (13) and (14) are exact, but not directly useful. We seek computational 
approximations to these, in terms of the ( , )m niP , so that the latter are determined from 
these approximating equations.  The choices made in this pursuit are dictated by 
simplicity, as consistent with the goal of initial tests of the computational entry-time 
approach to dynamic reliability.  If utility of this approach is established, then more 
sophisticated and efficient approximations can be subsequently pursued.  
In Equation (13) we obtain a finite-difference approximation, by introducing the 
following approximations: 
1) Throughout t is replaced by tn, except that in the argument of the integrators Λij and 
the transition rates λij it is replaced by tn+1.  Note that these replacements remove the t 
dependence in the integrands and integrators, so that the integrals over t effectively 
become multiplication by ∆t.  (The resulting computational method is explicit, because 
of the replacement of t by tn in the unknown entry-time probabilities.) 
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( , ) ( , )( ', ) .i m n i m ni n








3) Values of the entry-time state probabilities at an arbitrary grid point, say 
( , ) ( , ),
m n
t tτ τ=
  are replaced by the corresponding computational approximation, 
4) The remaining integral over τ’ is explicitly evaluated, 
'1
'
' 1 '1 1 ' 1( ', ) ( , ) ( , ).
m
m






+ + + +Λ = Λ − Λ  
The result of these manipulations is 
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= = − = −
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  (15) 
where T=N∆t is some terminal time.  In Equation (14) we make similar replacements, 
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1: , 0 : 1.I n N= −
 (16) 
Equations (15) and (16) are used, along with the initial conditions, to obtain 
( , )m n
iP and 
( , )m m
iP . 
( , )m m
iP
 
is the state probability that we are after at time t=m∆t. The 
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detailed procedure is as follows. The (0,0)iP  are given by 
(0,0) (0)(0,0)i i iP P P= = (the initial 
conditions). For 0m = and 0n =  the only unknowns in the I Equation (15) are the I 
unknowns (0,1)iP . These unknowns appear linearly, and each is only one of these 
equations, so that the solution is explicit. With the (0,1)iP  known, Equations (16) for 
1m =  and 1n =  are a system of I linear equations in the I unknowns (1,1)iP , and can be 
solved accordingly. This pattern repeats for a sequentially increasing values of 
2,3,...,n N= . First Equations (15) are solved, as a diagonal linear system of I equations 
in as many unknowns (the ( , 1)m niP + ) for each value of n, in order of 
increasing 0,1, 2,...m n= . Then Equations (16) give the I unknowns ( 1, 1)n niP + + . 
Experience with particle transport suggests that conservation and nonnegativity of 
probability are two desirable properties of computational approximations. It is seen from 
Equation (16) that the above method delineated above satisfies 
( 1, 1) ( , )
1 1
I I





≡   
so that probability is conserved (up to roundoff error in the computations). The example 
in Chapter III shows this scheme need not produce nonnegative probabilities, but also 
suggests the manner in which this fails is relatively harmless. 
Explicit methods typically have first-order accuracy, so that  
( , ) (1) ( , ) ( )m ni iP P t O tτ− = ∆  
Where m and n vary with the time step so that m t∆ and n t∆ remain fixed, at τ  and t , 
respectively. We verify this in details in Chapter III. 
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In the approximations made above, there is some arbitrariness in the discretization 
choices, especially in the first step (see above label (1) in the assumption part). By using 
a backward time approximation for calendar time in the probabilities and a forward 
approximation in the transition rates and integrators, it removes the t dependence in the 
integrands and integrators, so that the integrals over t effectively become multiplication 
by ∆t. 
This deterministic computational solution method for the computational solution of 
the generalized state-transition equations will be used, in the following chapter, to apply 
the entry-time processes to some test examples. First, the entry-time approach is applied 
to a semianalytically solvable example and compare to the semianalytic solutions of the 
example. Following that, the entry-time approach is compared to simulation. Once the 
computational algorithm is thus verified, it will then be employed in subsequent chapters 
for purposes of exploring the application of entry-time processes to asset management 
for nuclear power plants. 
   
23 
CHAPTER III 
VERIFICATION OF THE DISCRETE ALGORITHM 
The purpose of this chapter is to verify the computational method developed in 
Chapter II, by some hypothetical examples. In Section 3.1, a semianalytically solvable 
four-state example is given, and the discrete algorithm is compared to its semianalytic 
solutions. The discrete methodology is compared to simulation for a three-state example 
in Section 3.2. In the last section of this chapter, an RIAM base application of this 
methodology is given to show the potential application of entry-time processes to asset 
management for nuclear power plants. 
The work described in this chapter is closely based on work co-written by the 
author and P Nelson (see [23] for details). More detailed analysis is given in this 
dissertation than in the journal paper. 
3.1 A Semianalytically Solvable Example 
The purpose of this section is to verify the computational method developed in 
the preceding section, by comparing its performance to the (nearly) analytic solution of a 
simple three-state problem contrived to lend itself to such a solution.  The example and 
its semianalytic solution are formulated in Section 3.1.1.  Computational results via the 
finite-difference method developed in the preceding Chapter II are described in Section 
3.1.2. 
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3.1.1 Formulation and Semianalytic Solution 
Consider a component that can be in four states: 
State 1:  In service, as received from the manufacturer; 
State 2:  Out of service for repair; 
State 3:  In service, as a refurbished unit; 
State 4:  Out of service, for salvage. 
Failures of manufacturer equipment are assumed to be distributed cumulatively as 
the Weibull distribution, 
1
1 1 1( ; , ) : 1 exp( ( / ) ),W βτ α β = − − τ α  
 
for appropriate values of  1α  and 1β .  Once a manufacturer component fails it enters 
state 2, where it is refurbished in 0.1 years.  It then returns to service as a refurbished 
component.  Failures of refurbished components are distributed as 2 2( ; , ),W τ α β  where 
presumably 1 2α α≤  and 1 2β β≤ .  Once a refurbished component fails no further repairs 
are attempted, so it is sent to salvage. 
It is well known that Weibull distribution is commonly used in reliability field 
because it is convenient as a model for various physics phenomena and it has a clear 
physical sense as a distribution of external values [24]. However, the traditional Weibull 
distribution widely used in reliability analysis can only model monotone increasing or 
decreasing failure rate functions. For many complex systems, the failure rate function 
exhibits a bathtub shape. The bathtub shape of equipment failure rate changes with time 
is given in Figure 3. At the early stage of operation, also known as the burn-in period, 
failure rate decreases rapidly as manufacturing and construction defects are repaired (this 
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phenomena is also called “infant mortality”). As the system stabilizes the failure rate 
levels off. This second stage is called the useful life period and during this stage failure 
rate increases slowly. As equipment wears out, the degradation becomes dominant, and 
the failure rate increases. This third stage is called the wear-out period. If all three stages 
of FR vs. time are plotted, the curve resembles a bath-tub. This bathtub curve of Figure 3 
summarizes the life-time aging of equipment or component [25]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Bathtub curve failure rate 
 
A modified three-parameter Weibull model is introduced in [26] to capture the 
bathtub shape failure rate for some components. Another way to capture the bathtub 
shape failure rate by Weibull distribution is to use a “weighted sum of Weibull 
distributions”,  
1 1 2 2( ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )F t w W t w W tα β α β= × + − ×  
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where w  is a weighted parameter and ( ; , ) : 1 exp( ( / ) )W t βα β = − − τ α . Here we have 1 1β <  so 
that the first term captures the infant mortality and 2 1β >  so that the second term 
captures the aging effects. 
Hence the corresponding failure rate is: 
1 2( ) (1 ) ( )( )
1 ( )







( , , )( ) dW tf t
dt
α β
=  and 2 22




For example, here we take 1 2 1 220.0, 0.5, 6.0α α β β= = = = and 0.5w =  so that the 
failure distribution is equally weighted between the two distributions. Figure 4 shows the 
bathtub failure rate plot using the above parameters. 
For this example equipment, the appropriate initial conditions are 
( )(0) 1 0 0 0 .P = We know from the statement of the problem that the only way the 
equipment transits out of State 1 is when it is out of service for repair (State 2) and the 
failures of equipment are defined by the Weibull distribution 
1
1 1 1( ; , ) : 1 exp( ( / ) )W βτ α β = − − τ α . Therefore, for 0 0t t≥ ≥ , the probability that the 
equipment is in State 1 is given by: 
1
1 0 1 1 1( , ) 1 ( ; , ) exp( ( / ) ),P t t W t t β= − α β = − α  
Similarly, the probability that the equipment is in State 2 is given as follows: 
2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1( , ) ( ; , ) (( .1 ) 0; , )P t t W t W t t= α β − − ∧ ∨ α β , (∧ = “min”, ∨ = “max”), 
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where 0 1 1( ; , )W t α β  is the probability system transits into State 2 and 
0 1 1(( .1 ) 0; , )W t t− ∧ ∨ α β  gives the probability system transits out State 2.  
 




















Figure 4. Bathtub failure rate plot using “weighted sum of Weibull distributions” 
 
It is a little bit complex for the calculation of probabilities system is in States 3 and 
4.  It is clear from the definition of states that 3 0 4 0( , ) 0 and ( , ) 0P t t P t t= = when 0.1t <  
because there is no transition from State 3 and hence no transition from State 3 to State 4. 
When 0.1t ≥ , both 3P  and 4P  involve quadratures (definite integrals) of analytic 
functions as shown below: 
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[ ]
{ }0min , .1
3 0 1 1 2 2
.1
( , ) '( .1; , ) 1 ( ; , )  ,
t t
P t t W s W t s ds
+




1 1 2 2
.1
( , ) '( .1; , ) ( ; , ) 
t t
P t t W s W t s ds
+
= − α β − α β  
Hence, the corresponding solutions are (∧ = “min”, ∨ = “max”), for 0 0t t≥ ≥ , 
1
1 0 1 1 1( , ) 1 ( ; , ) exp( ( / ) ),P t t W t t β= − α β = − α  
( )( )( ) ( )( )1 1
2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0
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0 1 0 1
( , ) ( ; , ) (( .1 ) 0; , )
( ; , ),  .1,
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0,  .1,
exp ( .1 ) 0 / exp / ,
P t t W t W t t
W t t
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The solutions for P1 and P2 are analytic.  Those for 3P  and 4P  involve quadratures of 
analytic functions.  Those quadratures are easily carried out computationally (see 
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Section 3.1.2 for details).  In that sense the entire solution is known semianalytically.  
The finite-difference method of the preceding section will now be tested against this 
semianalytic benchmark. 
3.1.2 Computational Results 
As discussed in the preceding section that the solutions for 3P  and 4P  involve 
quadratures of analytic functions.  Here in this section those quadratures are carried out 
computationally via MatLab implementation (see Appendix F for details). For each t, 
when evaluating the quadratures, 0.0001s∆ =  is applied in the MatLab code. To check 
the accuracy of the evaluated quadratures using 0.0001s∆ = , 0.0005,0.001s∆ =  are also 
applied to the code for comparison. Table 1 shows the different values for 3P  and 4P  
evaluated at some time points. 
 
Table 1  













0.5 0.14844     0.14859 0.14878 0.032866    0.032899 0.032940      
1 0.23108     0.23118 0.23132  0.13133     0.13138 0.13146     
2 0.23719     0.23724 0.23731        0.37610     0.37619 0.37629       
3 0.17955     0.17958 0.17962        0.58591     0.58600 0.58612      
4 0.12204     0.12205 0.12207        0.73572     0.73582 0.73594     
5 0.07884     0.07885 0.07887      0.83488     0.83983 0.83511        
6 0.049601    0.049607 0.049614      0.89808     0.89818 0.89831       
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From the above table we can see that the computational results of the semianalytic 
solution are believed to be accurate to (at least) three digits as presented.  
For this section the parameters of the preceding section were taken 
as 1 2 1 20.5,  1.0,  1.0 and 1.25α α β β= = = = . From the definition of transition rates and 
cumulative transition rates from Section 2.1, we can easily get the corresponding 
nonzero transition rates and cumulative transition rates for the above system. The 
transition rates and cumulative transition functions are 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )






















































− − α β
= − − − α β  
≥ −.1
= 	
∞, < − .1
 
( ) ( )2 2ln 1 ; , .t W t43Λ τ, τ= − − − α β      
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Figure 5. Comparison of computed probabilities to the semianalytic solution 
 
The first six years of the corresponding solutions are shown in Figure 5, with the 
semianalytic solution of the preceding section plotted as the discrete points (x’s), and the 
computational results, with 0.1t∆ = , plotted as the solid lines in the same figure. The 
computational approximation is practically identical to the semianalytic solution, 
although some discrepancy is graphically distinguishable, especially in the state 
probabilities 3P  and 4P , at the later (calendar) times. These results are for a relatively 
small time step, but results for larger time steps are totally unviable, because they fail to 
capture any transfers from state 2 to state 3. This is because at these larger time steps all 
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such transfers are contained mathematically in the terms corresponding to the integrals 
over the triangular regions that were neglected in the computational method of the 
preceding section. Methods presumably could be produced that are not subject to this 
failing, but the objective of the present chapter is to verify and understand the specific 
method of Chapter II. 
The computational errors in the state probabilities, as compared to the semianalytic 
solution (believed to be accurate to the magnitude of 10-3) are plotted in Figure 6. To 
see the trends of error changes with decreasing time step, three groups of error data are 
shown in that figure, with t

=0.1, 0.02 and 0.025 (plotted as blue lines, discrete points 
and red lines respectively).  It can be seen clearly from Figure 6 that, the error decreases 
with decreasing time step. The errors are in the order of 10-3 ~ 10-4 for P1, P3 and P4. 
Because of the sudden jump in P2, from 0 to around 0.05 at time t=0, the errors in P2 at 
the first few time points are relatively larger.  Therefore, it is not easy to see the order of 
accuracy from the plot for P

2, however, a detailed study of the error data (as shown in 




4(t) are given due to limited space of 




3(t) are similar) for P

2 shows that the 
order of the errors is around 10-4 ~ 10-5. This means that the finite-difference 
methodology of Chapter II has very good accuracy, compared to the results from 
semianalytic results.  This provides the desired verification of the finite-difference 
methodology of Chapter II. 
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Figure 6. Plots of error for each state, as compared to the semianalytic solution 
 
Table 2  
Comparison of  P2(t) and  P4(t) for different  t 
t  P2(t)  P4(t) 
 
	 
 =0.05   =0.025 
	   =0.05   =0.025 
1 0.1745e-4       0.0409e-4 0.0099e-4 0.0022        0.0020 0.0014 
2 0.0117e-4     0.0020e-4 0.0004e-4 0.0094        0.0055 0.0030 
3 0.0493e-4        0.0125e-4 0.0032e-4 0.0096        0.0054 0.0029 
4 0.0637e-4       0.0159e-4 0.0040e-4 0.0069        0.0038 0.0020 
5 0.0588e-4      0.0146e-4 0.0036e-4 0.0043        0.0024 0.0012 
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Results relevant to detailed computational accuracy appear in Figure 7.  Here ( )iPε  
is the computational error in the state probability iP , as compared to the semianalytic 
solution (believed to be accurate to three digits represented in the error as discussed 
early in this section), and for the time step indicated in the plots.  The corresponding 
order of accuracy ( )in P  is defined as 
ln ( ) / ( )






ε ε  
=
 
where pε  is the corresponding error at the preceding time step. It is shown from the plots 
that the values for 1P∆  and 2P∆  clearly cluster toward two and the values for 3P∆  and 
4P∆  go toward one (also shown in Table 3). This confirms the order one accuracy 
anticipated in Section 2.2. The sudden changes in 2P∆  is most likely due to the error 
accumulation/ cancellation during the calculation, further study of the reason is not 
addressed here. 
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Figure 7. Plots of order of accuracy for each state 
 
Table 3  
Order of accuracy for the discrete algorithm in this example 
t n(P1(t)) n(P2(t)) n(P3(t)) n(P4(t)) 
 




















1 1.9579     1.9801 2.0940    2.0473 0.2122    0.4793 0.1419    0.5673 
2 1.9937     1.9969 2.5501    2.3649 0.7672    0.7980 0.7746    0.8535 
3 2.0018     2.0008 1.9759    1.9885 0.8306    0.8529 0.8400    0.9092 
4 2.0034     2.0016 2.0029    2.0014 0.8399    0.8660 0.8569    0.9436 
5 2.0025     2.0011 2.0080    2.0039 0.8370    0.8677 0.8720    0.9934 
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We take these results, as regards both accuracy and order of accuracy, as 
providing confirmation of the correctness of the finite-difference method of Chapter II, 
and of its MatLab implementation that is the fundamental source of the computational 
results presented throughout this dissertation. 
Please note here that in the above example the system does not allow “state 
reentry”, which means that once the system leaves a state, it never comes back to the 
same state. However, in some scenario, it is often required to have a state reentry. For 
example, when a system is replaced after it gets into the “failure state” from the “normal 
running state”, it can come back to “normal running state” and this procedure can be 
repeated. In the next section, an example that permits state reentry is constructed and the 
computational results from the entry-time approach are compared to simulations. 
3.2 A Simplified Computational Example, with Comparison to Simulation 
This section is devoted to a hypothetical three-state example that permits state 
reentry. Computational results from the above methodology are compared to simulations. 
The three-state example is formulated in Section 3.2.1. In Section 3.2.2 we apply to 
the three-state example the MatLab finite-difference code used to obtain the results 
described in the preceding section, and we verify this application by comparison against 
(differential and integral) results obtained from simulation. 
3.2.1 Formulation 
The characteristics of the three-state example are: 
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• The three states are “in-service (1),” “out of service for preventive maintenance 
(PM) (state 2),” and “out-of-service for corrective maintenance (CM) (state 3).” 
• The transition rate from 1 to 3 is defined by an annual failure rate of .05 + 0.2s, 
where s is “time in service” (sojourn time in state 1).  (This simulates aging 
effects, but not infant mortality.) 
• The transition rate from state 1 to state 2 is defined by a policy of completely 
replacing systems after they have been in service for a “replacement period” Tr.  
The value of this parameter is not specified, because we take the issue associated 
with this example as determination of the preferred choice of the replacement 
period.  This is similar to issues that arise in both life-cycle management [27] and 
optimization of preventive maintenance [28] in NPPs. 
• The transition rate from 2 to 1 is defined by the fact that systems can be 
completely replaced within 0.2pt =  years, provided the outage is planned so that 
replacement equipment can be ordered and on hand when the outage occurs. 
• The transition rate from state 3 to state 1 is defined by the fact that it 
requires 0.4ct =  years to replace the system, if the outage is not planned, so that 
replacement equipment must be specially ordered. 
• There are no transitions, in either direction, between states 2 and 3. 
The graphical relationships among the three states can be seen in Figure 8 where PM 
Period 0.2pt =  years and CM Period 0.4ct =  years. 
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Figure 8. Relationships of states for the example of Section 3.2.1 
 
3.2.2 Verification 
Similar to the solutions of transition rates in the Section 3.1.2, from the definition of 
transition rates and cumulative transition rates from Section 2.1, for this three-state 
example the nonzero values of ijλ  and ijΛ are: 
21 31
12 13
( , ) ( ),  ( , ) .05 0.2( ),
( , ) ( .2),  ( , ) ( .4)
r
t t T t t
t t t t
λ τ δ τ λ τ τ
λ τ δ τ λ τ δ τ
= − − = + −






( , ) ( ),  ( , ) .05( ) 0.1( ) ,  
( , ) ( .2),  ( , ) ( .4).
r
t H t T t t t
t H t t H t
Λ τ τ Λ τ τ τ
Λ τ τ Λ τ τ
+
+ +
= − − = − + −




is the Heaviside step function with (0) 0H
−
= , as consistent with the left-
atomic convention (see Section 2.1).  
   
39 
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Figure 9. State probabilities plot from simulations 
 
In Figure 9 we plot, over an operating period of 20 years, the time-dependent state 
probabilities, for a replacement period of 3
r
T =  years, as obtained from 10,000 sample 
paths (green solid line) and 5,000 sample paths (blue dashed line) respectively, and 
0.1t∆ =  years.  It is clear to see from the plots that results obtained from simulations 
using different number of sample paths agree with each other with only small differences.  
In Table 4, the yearly averaged probability differences for two simulations 
( )10,000 5,000
0 0
1 1( ) ( ) - ( ) ,    1, 2,3
T T
i i iP t dt P t P t dt iT T
∆ = =   
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are given. As we can see from the table that the integral quantities of the probability 
difference of results obtained from simulation using different number of sample paths 
are at a magnitude of 10-4, and this gives us a sense of accuracy of the simulation 
methods using 10,000 sample paths. Therefore, the results obtained from simulation 
using 10,000 sample paths will be used as a standard in comparison with the results 
obtained from the entry-time process calculations. 
 
Table 4  
Mean annual probability differences for two simulations 
t 2 4 6 8 10 16 20 
1
0




∆  5.49e-4 9.09e-4 6.99e-4 3.79e-4 8.80e-4 7.10e-4 2.90e-4 
2
0




∆  0 1.38e-3 1.60e-4 1.10e-4 2.39e-4 5.00e-4 1.89e-4 
3
0




∆  5.50e-4 4.69e-4 5.40e-4 2.70e-4 6.40e-4 2.09e-4 4.79e-4 
 
 
In Figure 10 we plot, over an operating period of 20 years, the computed time-
dependent state probabilities, for a replacement period of 3rT =  years.  The solid blue 
lines represent simulation results, as obtained from 10,000 sample paths, and 0.1t∆ =  
years.  In the following we treat this as a standard for assessing the above finite-
difference method.  However, these simulation results contain some high-frequency 
small-amplitude variations that presumably represent stochastic effects (noise), even 
with this number of sample paths.  (These effects are most visible in Figure 10 as the 
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high-frequency oscillations in P3.)  Significantly smaller numbers of sample paths lead 
to similar effects, with larger amplitudes in the oscillations (see the plots in Figure 9 for 
example of this phenomenon).   
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Figure 10. Comparison of state probabilities using same time step 
 
The finite-difference results from step size 0.1t∆ =  years appear in Figure 10 as 
discontinuous green lines.  These are grossly similar to the corresponding simulation 
(blue line), but there are noteworthy differences:  
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1) The finite-difference results for 1P  (operating) and 2P  (PM) agree well (to 
graphical accuracy) with the simulations, away from the PM spikes that 
occur, with decreasing amplitude, approximately at multiples of three years.  
However, at or near these PM  spikes there are two significant differences: 
(a) The expected spikes (downward jump in 1P  and upward jump in 2P ) are, 
except for the first, somewhat larger for the finite-difference solution than 
for the simulation. 
(b) In the finite-difference solution the expected jumps approximately at 
multiples of three years are preceded by unexpected precursors consisting 
of smaller jumps in the opposite direction.  There is no indication of these 
precursors in the simulation.  In the case of 1P  ( 2P ) this “false” spike is 
even greater than one (respectively, less than zero). 
2) The finite-difference results for 3P  (corrective maintenance) are consistently 
slightly lower and later than the corresponding simulation results. 
We now explore the sources of these differences. 
If the simulation results are a reliable standard, then it is a reasonable hypothesis 
that these effects are due to discretization error. Figure 11 displays results intended to 
test this hypothesis.  The solid blue lines in this figure represents the results of the same 
simulation as described in conjunction with Figure 10, except now with a sampling 
period of  0.05t∆ =  years.  The data points themselves are not plotted, in order to 
minimize the graphical clutter.  This, along with the higher sampling frequency, makes 
even more apparent the low-amplitude high-frequency noise mentioned above.  The 
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dashed green lines and solid red lines in Figure 11 represent the corresponding finite-
difference results, with time steps of respectively 0.10t∆ =  and 0.05t∆ =  years. 
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Figure 11. Comparison of state probabilities using different time steps 
 
The general agreement between the finite-difference and simulation results becomes 
better as the time step is reduced in the finite-difference method; in particular, the finite-
difference results for state 3P  (corrective maintenance) are becoming larger as the time 
step decreases, and therefore in better general agreement with the simulation results, to 
the extent that can be judged by the apparent persistent noise in the corresponding 
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simulation results.  This provides some confirmation that effect 2) above stems from 
discretization error in the finite-difference results. 
However, the effects labeled (1) above do not seem to disappear, or even moderate, 
as the time step is decreased.  If one studies individual data points in the finite-difference 
results, the following structure emerges.  The excessive magnitude in the expected PM 
spikes (past the first) occurs as a single data point, regardless of the size of the time step, 
and that point is located at the earliest time within the expected spike. 
The remaining data in the expected PM spike take values in about the expected 
range.  Likewise the false precursor occurs as a single data point, which invariably is 
located at a time of 0.2pt =  years prior to the initial time of the expected PM spike. 
We believe these two phenomena are related, and stem from the following 
considerations.  One can consider the finite-difference approximations (15) and (16) as a 
discrete time Markov model, provided the “discrete transition coefficients,” 
1 1 1(0, ) and ( , ) ( , ) ij n ij m n ij m nt t tλ τ τ+ + +Λ − Λ  
satisfy  
   
 1 1 1
1 1
(0, ) 1 and ( , ) ( , ) 1,
I I
ij n ij m n ij m n
i i
t t tλ τ τ+ + +
= =
 ≤ Λ − Λ ≤    (17) 
 
identically in i, m and n so that these coefficients can be interpreted as bona fide 
probabilities.  For the example of this section the constraining inequality (17) fails for 
1j = (operating state) and  1 1 0.2n m pt tτ+ +− = =  years, because then 
2 1 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1( , ) ( , ) 1,  and ( , ) ( , ) 0,j m n j m n j m n j m nt t t tτ τ τ τ+ + + + + +Λ − Λ = Λ − Λ >  
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the latter because there is some probability a system entering the operating state between 
times mτ  and 1mτ + , and further remaining in that state until time nt , will require 
corrective maintenance some time between nt and 1nt + .  The pathological consequences 
of this phenomenon are particularly amplified when a preceding discontinuity occurred 
between the two entry times (i.e., between mτ  and 1mτ + ), which corresponds to time rT  
following both beginning and end of the preceding PM spikes.  These correspond 
respectively to the times of the false precursors and of the points of excessive magnitude 
in the expected PM spikes. 
We choose here to accept these clearly incorrect results (probabilities less than zero 
and greater than one), because in the limit 0t∆ →  the effect of these false values 
becomes negligible in computing the integral quantities that are ultimately of real 
interest in applications1 . (See the following section.)  Further, we do not attempt to 
develop ad hoc “fix ups” to deal with these phenomena, notwithstanding that they are 
cosmetic liabilities, because they tend to cancel each other in computation of integral 
quantities (see the results in Table 5).  It would be of some interest to develop a fix based 
on renormalization of the discrete transition coefficients described above, but we shall 
not pursue that here.  
Some comparative instances, finite differences versus simulation, of integral 
quantities (mean annual residence time in each of the three states, over a 20 year 
operating period (terminal time)) are shown in Table 5. For the finite-difference 
                                                 
1
 In this respect these phenomena bear some resemblance to the well-known Gibbs’ phenomenon. 
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approximation the integral providing the mean annual residence time was evaluated by 
means of the trapezoidal rule, with the probabilities as determined from the finite-
difference approximation, and with a time step of 0.1 years.  For the (10,000 sample path) 
simulation the integral was similarly evaluated, except the probabilities of a given state 
at time t were computed as the fraction of the selected sample paths in that state at that 
time. 
The baseline (topmost) entries under the finite-difference columns in Table 5 are the 
residence times as obtained with a time step of 0.10t∆ =  years.  These agree with the 
simulation results to more-or-less two digits of accuracy. The parenthetical results 
underneath were obtained by extrapolating to zero time step, under the assumption of 
first-order accuracy, these baseline results along with the corresponding results with a 
time step of 0.2 years.  This extrapolation adds at least an additional digit of accuracy, in 
comparison to the simulation results.  This adds further confidence that the finite-
difference method of Chapter II is both correct, and has been correctly implemented in 
the MatLab code of Appendix F.   
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Table 5  
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A detailed comparison of the relative efficiency and accuracy of the finite-difference 
and simulation methods is beyond the intended scope of the present work, which is 
intended merely to verify feasibility of finite-difference methods in general, and to verify 
the specific finite-difference method of Chapter II.  However, some preliminary 
comments on these important issues are appropriate.  As coded to obtain the results 
presented here, the computational effort for the finite-difference method scales inversely 
as the cube of the time step.  Thus a decrease of a factor of two in step size occasions 
eight times as much computational time.  What is gained by that eightfold increased cost, 
at least for sufficiently small time steps, is an increase of a factor of two in time 
resolution (sampling frequency) and a reduction by a factor of two in the discretization 
error.  If one wishes to obtain the same gains from the simulation, then there also will be 
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a factor of eight increase in the computational time, from a factor of two increase in the 
time for the “post-processing” sampling in time, and a factor of four increase in the 
required number of sample paths; the latter stems from the presumed inverse square root 
of number of sample paths dependence of error for the simulation.   
Thus the computational requirements for the two approaches scale similarly, with 
time resolution and accuracy.  For a time step of 0.2 years for the finite-difference 
method, and the same sampling period with 10,000 sample paths for the simulation, the 
two methods require roughly the same times (approximately 4 mins 15 secs and 3 mins 
15 secs, respectively, on a Pentium 4 single processor PC).  Exactly what one obtains in 
accuracy for these comparable efforts seems to depend sensitively on exactly what is 
computed.  A detailed study of this important issue is not done here, but one can make 
some inference for differential quantities (e.g., the ( )iP t ) from Figure 10. (especially the 
graph for the corrective maintenance state), and from Table 5 for integral quantities.  
The relative accuracy of the two approaches for rare events (e.g., occurrence of the 
preventive maintenance state, for a replacement period of ten years; cf.  Table 5) is an 
especially intriguing issue that perhaps warrants subsequent detailed study.  This is 
particularly important to considerations related to the relative merits of the two 
methodologies for application to the very difficult issue of prediction of low-probability 
high-consequence events. 
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3.3 An Example Application in RIAM 
As discussed in Chapter I, as part of the RIAM process, PM Basis program gained 
its popularity in recent years because it is beneficial to the plant management to make 
maintenance decisions (for example, for people of risk averse, the lease risky policy 
might be taken), especially when the system or component is critical (risk related), either 
for safety or for generation.  In this chapter, we in with the example of Section 3.2, but 
add hypothetical financial information, for purposes of illustrating how entry-time 
approaches can be applied to a LCM/PM based application.  
In addition to the states and transition rates defined in the preceding section, the 
costs related to each state are defined as follows: 
While the (generation-critical) component of interest is operating the plant net revenue at 
an annual rate of $50,000,000, conceived as revenue of $150M per year, less fixed 
expenses of $50M per year and variable operating expenses of $50M per year. Each 
planned outage costs $2,000,000 for repairs, or $10M per year, plus the fixed expenses, 
for a net annualized revenue of -$60M per year during planned outages for preventive 
maintenance.  Each unplanned outage costs $10,000,000 ($25M per year), in addition to 
the $100M per year for fixed and variable expenses, for a revenue stream of -$125M per 
year during forced outages. 
Hence the cost and revenue related to each state can be found in Table 6. 
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Table 6  
Revenue and cost data related to each state 
State No. Net Revenue/Cost Revenue/Cost Details 
Revenue $150M 





Operating Expense $50M 
Repair Expense $10M  
2 
 
-$60M Fixed Expense $50M 
Repair Expense $25M 





Operating Expense $50M 
 
 
In Figure 12 we plot, over an operating period of 20 years, the time-dependent state 
probabilities acquired by using the MatLab code for entry-time applications (see 
Appendix F for details), for replacement periods of 0.8,1.8 and 3.8
r
T =  years 
respectively with 0.1t∆ =  years.  The solid blue lines represent probabilities of states 
with a replacement period of 0.8
r
T =  years, while the solid green line corresponds to  
1.8
r
T =  years, and the red solid line to 3.8
r
T =  years. 
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Figure 12.  State probability plots, with replacement period as a parameter 
 
The first overall observation is that the PM greatly improves the reliability of the 
system and hence decreases the risk of system failure (in state 3) over a 20 year time 
period comparing to the reliability performance with no maintenance. The probability 
plots for state in Figure 12 show that the probability that the system is in the failed state 
decreases as the corresponding replacement period 
r
T  decreases, consequent to different 
PM policies. 
Comparing the three different maintenance policies, there is not much improvement 
(numerically) when doing preventive maintenance more frequently. For example, with a 
more frequent preventive maintenance (e.g. 0.8
r
T = ), the averaged  failure probability is 
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about 0.06 less than the averaged failure probability of a less frequent preventive 
maintenance (e.g. 3.8
r
T = ). 
But from the viewpoint of a NPP life time, this can make a huge difference in 
reliability calculations. This is extremely important for current NPPs, which have been 
in operation for decades. It is also important for PRA/GRA models, as will be discussed 
in Chapter V. 
Figure 13 consists of graphs of annual revenue, variance and skewness, for a plant 
lifetime of 20 years, and various representative values of
r
T . Briefly, these were 
computed as follows: 
When doing simulation, information from different sample paths is collected and 
used for final calculations. Here we use similar sample path idea that is used in 





( ) ( )  ,n i i
i





iR  is the annualized net revenue in state i , as indicated in the system description of 
the preceding section (i.e., 1  $50R M=  per year, 2  $60R M= −  per year and 
3  $125R M= −  per year); 
iI  is the indicator function for state i ; and 
( )S tω  is the  system state at time t , along sample path ω . 
The expected value of that annualized net revenue is then 
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3( ) ( )
1 1





R R d R P t dtω ω
=
−
= =   (18) 
where 
( )( ) ( )  i iP t I S t dω ω= 
 
is the probability the system is in state i at time t. 
The Entry-time approach produces precisely discrete approximations to the 
probabilities ( )iP t .  The expected net revenues in Figure 13 were produced by using the 
finite-difference methodology, with time step 0.1 years, and then evaluating the 
rightmost integrals in Equation (18) by means of the trapezoidal rule.  Refinement to a 
step size of 0.05 years produced relatively minor changes in the computed values. 
The annualized standard deviations and skewnesses were similarly computed, as 
respectively 
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Figure 13. Annualized values of various measures of economic performance 
 
The first overall observation is that the hypothetical plant under consideration has a 
high degree of inherent uncertainty in financial performance, as the standard deviation in 
annualized net revenue tends to be close to twice the expected net revenues.  Further, the 
large negative values of skewness indicate that much of the variance is located along a 
long left tail of the underlying distribution; i.e., the business is subject to a substantial 
downside risk. 
The most aggressive of the three preventive maintenance policies described, a 
replacement period of 0.8 years (PM cycle of 1 year), substantially reduces this 
downside risk, as indicated by: 
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i. a standard deviation that tends to be substantially smaller than that for the 
most passive PM policy (replacement period of 3.8 years), and slightly 
smaller than that for the intermediate policy (replacement period of 1.8 
years); 
ii. a variance that is substantially larger algebraically (i.e., less negative) than 
that of either of the two alternative policies. 
This shortest of the three replacement periods considered is therefore likely to be 
adopted by concerns that are strongly risk averse.  However, the graph of expected net 
revenue shows that this decrease in downside risk is purchased at a cost of some 10-15% 
reduction in expected net revenue, depending upon the year.  Management more inclined 
to accept a higher degree of generation risk might be inclined to adopt the intermediate 
replacement period of 1.8 years. 
As compared to this intermediate replacement period, the most passive replacement 
policy of a 3.8 year replacement period apparently provides no advantage in either 
expected net revenue or reduction in downside risk.  For the assumed parameters the vast 
majority of instances will require corrective maintenance over a period of 3.8 years, so 
that this longest replacement period is essentially tantamount to a policy of running to 
failure.  
As we can see from the above example that the comparison of PM policies is based 
on “maximize the revenue” strategy. However, its counterpart, “minimizing the cost” is 
often used in industry when doing such analysis. In Chapter V, such implementation (i.e. 
minimizing the cost) will be carried out in the analysis for PM policies of a main 
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generator system to accord with the way that is familiar to industry people who are doing 
similar analysis. 
As demonstrated by the example above, the computational entry-time approach is 
capable of providing guidance as to PM policies that are most consistent with 
management objectives. Hence the entry-time approach can be applied to a LCM/PM 
based scenario in nuclear power plants where time-dependent feature is important. 
However, this methodology does require availability of suitable time-dependent failure 
rates.  There are limited sources of such information that are available. Issues related to 
data and databases will be addressed in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND DATABASE FOR APPLICATIONS 
We have demonstrated, in Chapter III, both the computational accuracy and the 
applicability of the entry-time processes. Also in Section 3.3, an example is given to 
show how the entry-time processes can be applied to a LCM/PM based scenario. Our 
next step is to focus on the application of this methodology to realistic NPP applications, 
especially in the arenas of LCM/PM based applications. 
The first challenge to apply entry-time process to such applications is the 
availability of suitable time-dependent failure rates.  As mentioned in the preceding 
chapters, that accurate values of the “transition rates” are crucial to the application of 
entry-time methodology. As we know, there are two types of transition rates: policy 
driven (e.g., PM policies) and stochastic (e.g., failures). The basic objective of this 
chapter is to ascertain the possibility of obtaining failure rates, for real-world SSCs in 
NPPs, via application of standard statistical techniques to existing databases for 
reliability of such SSCs. In this chapter, the issues of data and database for the 
application of entry-time processes to the application of NPP applications are discussed. 
The EPIX database is introduced in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, the EPIX database is 
shown to be capable of providing time-dependent failure rates.  Following that, the target 
system (main generator) for further analysis is selected in Section 4.2. Then different 
failure data for main generators was selected and tested using different data 
interpretation schemes in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 the various results are compared, 
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and a “best data fit” distribution is selected as a basis for further work.  Further detailed 
analysis is carried out in Section 4.6, to generate time-dependent failure rates and the 
corresponding distribution(s).  These will then be employed in Chapter V, to generate 
various predictions via the entry-time model of the preceding chapters. 
4.1 Introduction to the EPIX Database 
The EPIX database [29]  was employed as a source of the data used to obtain the 
transition rates used in this dissertation, in the context of the entry-time approach 
developed in Chapters II and III.  The objective of this section is to review the history of 
this database, and its structure, especially as these are needed to justify its selection for 
use in this dissertation.  These descriptions closely follow that in [29] and the USNRC 
websites [30]. 
The EPIX failure database for nuclear power plants components has experienced 
several stages from the early 1970s.  
The first stage is set up of the initial data collection system. In the early 1970s, the 
industry and some research institutes recognized the need for failure data on nuclear 
plant components. As a result, a data collection system was developed whose objective 
was to make available reliability statistics (e.g., failure rates, mean-time-between-
failures, mean-time-to-restore) for safety related systems and components. This system, 
the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS), was developed by Southwest 
Research Institute (SwRI). Plants began reporting data on a voluntary basis in 1974, and 
continued reporting to SwRI until 1982.  
   
59 
In the second stage, failures of both safety and non-safety related components are 
reported. In January 1982, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) assumed 
management responsibility for the system. Originally the NPRDS only covered safety-
related systems and components. However, later the scope was expanded to cover any 
system important to safety and any system for which a loss of function can initiate 
significant plant transients. By the end of 1984, 86 nuclear power plant units were 
supplying detailed design data and failure reports on some 4,000 to 5,000 plant 
components from 30 systems. Data reported to NPRDS consisted of two kinds of reports: 
engineering reports and failure reports. The engineering reports provided detailed design 
and operating characteristics for each reportable component. The failure reports provided 
information on each reportable component whenever the component was unable to 
perform its intended function.  
In the third stage, EPIX replaces NPRDS. The NPRDS failure reports provided to 
INPO were generally generated by plant licensees utilizing maintenance records such as 
maintenance work orders. These reports utilized a standard set of component boundaries 
and failure mode definitions. The Equipment Performance and Information Exchange 
(EPIX) system replaced NPRDS since 1987. 
EPIX consists of: 
• a site-specific database controlled by each INPO member site with web-based 
data entry and retrieval, 
• an industry database on the INPO web site where selected parts of the site-
specific database are shared among plants, 
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• a retrieval tool that provides access to the vast historical equipment performance 
information available in the NPRDS. 
Events reported to EPIX include both complete failures of components and 
degraded component operation. The number of demands and operating hours (i.e., 
reliability data) and the unavailability are required to be collected for components in 
safety-related systems, for each plant. In addition, contributors to EPIX are also to 
include one-time estimates of the number of demands and run hours for other risk-
significant components. 
In comparison to other database used in current nuclear industry, such as WASH-
1400 [31] and the PLG2 Database [32], the INPO-EPIX database is the best database 
available to us, for the following reasons: 
• The EPIX database includes 400,000 failure reports on more than 900,000 
components since 1973 while the WASH-1400 only contains data from early 
1960 to 1973. 
• The EPIX database includes both complete failures of components and degraded 
component operation, while the PLG Database focuses mainly on complete 
failure of components. 
• It is feasible to generate time-dependent failure rate from the database due to the 
completeness of the data records. 
                                                 
2
 PLG was the former company name for current ABS Consulting Inc. 
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Information is extractable from the EPIX database by means of SQL3 queries. In the 
following section, we will employ this capability to test the ability of the INPO-EPIX 
database to provide, in conjunction with standard statistical tools, adequate estimates of 
time-dependent failure rates to be used in the application of entry-time processes. 
4.2 Applicability of the EPIX Database  
As mentioned in Chapter I, aging is becoming more and more important in NPPs, 
many of which have been in operation for decades, some now longer than their 
originally planned lifetimes. A consistent treatment of the dynamics of the evolution of 
aging and maintenance is critical to the quantitative study of system reliability. In order 
to show the importance of aging and the applicability of entry-time approach, we 
reviewed the EPIX database to identify a system that has the following features: 
• The system shows significant time-dependent (aging) features, i.e. it has time-
dependent failure (transition) rates. 
• The system is either safety related (for PRA model) or generation-risk related 
(for GRA model). That is, failure of the system will increase system risk or 
generation risk. 
There are 21 tables in the INPO Database named “nrcRadsView” in which we can 
find almost all the failure records from different sources (NPPs) for different type of 
components. The database is in Microsoft Access format and it is feasible to acquire 
records from it by using SQL queries. Starting from the table “tblAlternateDevice,” 
                                                 
3
 Commonly expanded as Structured Query Language, is a computer language designed for the retrieval 
and management of data in relational database management systems. 
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where we see a list of all components, we can find the all types of components that have 
more than 1000 records in the database using an SQL query such as: 
SELECT tblAlternateDevice.ComponentTypeCode,    
Count(tblAlternateDevice.ComponentTypeCode) AS Number_of_Records 
FROM tblAlternateDevice 
GROUP BY tblAlternateDevice.ComponentTypeCode 
HAVING (((Count(tblAlternateDevice.ComponentTypeCode))>1000)) 
ORDER BY Count(tblAlternateDevice.ComponentTypeCode) DESC; 
 
Please note that in the above SQL query, the condition is set as: “HAVING 
(((Count(tblAlternateDevice.ComponentTypeCode))>1000)”. The reason for that is a 
large number of failure records for a type of component is necessary in order to obtain 
good statistics.  
As can be seen from Table 7 below, which was created using the above query, there 
are around 30 types of components that have more than 1000 records in this table. We 
are seeking types of components that have significant time-dependent features. 
Therefore, according to the Weibull parameters from Barringer (see footnote 4), we 
choose “CKRBRK” (Circuit Breaker) and “MOTOR” from the list.  These have 103399 
and 15723 records respectively.  They will be used to test the ability of the INPO-EPIX 
database to provide, in conjunction with standard statistical tools, adequate estimates of 
time-dependent failure rates. The Weibull shape and scale parameters from the Barringer 
website are given in Table 8 and the parameters listed here will be compared to the 
parameters obtained from the data fit plots for Weibull distributions. 
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Table 7  
List of components that have more than 1000 records in the EPIX database 
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Table 8 
Weibull parameters as suggested by the Barringer website4  
Weibull Shape Weibull Scale (days) Component 
Name Low Typical High Low Typical High 
Circuit Breakers 0.5 1.5 3.0 2792 4167 58333 
Motors 0.5 1.2 3.0 46 6250 12500 
 
 
Each general type of component tends to come in several different models.  For 
example, Circuit Breaker Model DS 206 has two models: Model K and Model S. In 
order to determine the best estimate of failure rate for a certain component, we need to 
focus on components of the same model. The analysis done here is so focused. 
For circuit breakers, we choose the models that have more than 100 records in the 
database, while for motors we choose the models that have more than 20 records.  The 
difference is because there are substantially fewer records for motors than for circuit 
breakers. 
After appropriate SQL queries, we find there are four models of circuit breakers 
(two different models, but each has type “K” and type “S”) and 3 models for motors that 
meet the criteria of queries (i.e., have respectively more than 100 or 20 failure records in 
the database). 
For circuit breakers the respective numbers of failure records (please refer to 
Appendix A for sample of the failure records) are as shown in Table 9. The 
corresponding results for motors are as in Table 10. 
                                                 
4
 http://www.barringer1.com/wdbase.htm 
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Table 9  
Circuit breakers model and failure records in the EPIX database 
Circuit Breaker Model 
Number 
Type of the Model Number of Failure Records 
K 30 DS 206 S 81 
K 17 HFB3 S 106 
 
 
Table 10  
Motors model and failure records in the EPIX database 
Motor Model Number Type of the Model Number of Failure 
Records 
CS VSS S 23 
TBDP S 28 
FTYPE AN S 38 
 
 
Once the components were identified, we employed the standard statistical software 
MiniTAB [33] to obtain the failure rate for each of the different types of components 
(model numbers), as will now be described.  As a standard to judge which type of 
distribution we should choose, we use the A-D numbers (Anderson-Darling statistic5) as 
                                                 
5
 The Anderson-Darling statistic is a measure of how far the plot points fall from the fitted line in a 
probability plot. Minitab uses an adjusted AndersonDarling statistic, because the statistic changes when a 
different plot point method is used. A smaller AndersonDarling statistic indicates that the distribution fits 
the data better. 
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a measure of how well each of the three different distributions (Weibull, Exponential 
and Normal), as provided by MiniTAB, fits the observed distribution of failure times. 
The results will be shown below, for the various model number and model types. 
Here we choose not to show all the plots for each model type; rather, we plot here only 
the Weibull, Exponential and Normal distribution fits for circuit breakers with model 
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Figure 14. Weibull distribution plots for circuit breakers (DS 206 and type K) 6 
 
                                                 
6
 Throughout the dissertation, the units for all X axels in the MiniTab plots are days, if not specified 
otherwise. 
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A typical Weibull distribution can be found in the example given in Section 3.1. 
From the plotted MiniTAB results in the upper right of Figure 14 we can see that the 
Weibull distribution fits circuit breakers with model number DS 206 and type K failure 
records very well. This “percent plot 7” shows that almost all the failure “points” fall 
closely around the percentage plot line, which means that the distribution plot agrees 
with the failure record data very well. Also the “Rate plot”8 (lower right of Figure 14) 
shows that there are significant aging effects for this type of circuit breakers, as the 
hazard rate (failure rate) increases significantly as the system ages. 
A typical form of the exponential distribution pdf function is: 
, 0( , )








where λ  is a constant failure rate for the distribution. 
From the exponential distribution plots (Figure 15), we can see that the constant 
failure rate does not apply for the failure distribution of this particular type of circuit 
breakers. The “percent plot” (upper right plot) shows that almost all the failure “points” 
fall far away from the percentage plot (see also footnote 7) line, which means that the 
distribution plot does not agree with the failure record data at all. These graphically 
intuitive observations correspond more quantitatively to a much larger value of the A-D 
                                                 
7
 Fitted line of percent plot, which is a graphical representation of the percentiles. To make the fitted line, 
Minitab first calculates the percentiles for the various percents, based on the chosen distribution. The 
associated probabilities are then transformed and used as the y-variables. The percentiles may be 
transformed, depending on the distribution, and are used as the x-variables. The transformed scales, 
chosen to linearize the fitted line, differ depending on the distribution used. 
8
 Also known as hazard rate, or failure rate,  which is identical to the failure rate that was used in the entry-
time models. 
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statistic for the exponential distribution than was observed previously for the best-fit 
Weibull distribution.  The inability of a constant failure rate to fit the data presumably is 
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Figure 15. Exponential distribution plots for circuit breakers (DS 206 and type K). (The 
horizontal axes are time, in days) 
 
The typical form of the probability density function for a normal distribution is: 
2
2





= −  
where µ  is the mean and σ  is the standard deviation of the distribution. 
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Figure 16. Normal distribution plots for circuit breakers (DS 206 and type K) 
 
As clearly shown from the plots in Figure 16, same as the Weibull distribution plots 
in Figure 14, the normal distribution fits the failure records very well and the A-D 
statistic number is very small (the A-D number for normal distribution is 0.617, as 
compared to 0.767 for the Weibull distribution). The “percent plot” (upper right) shows 
that almost all the failure “points” fall closely around the percentage plot (see also 
footnote 7) line, which means that the distribution plot agrees with the failure record data 
very well. Also the “Rate plot” shows that there are significant aging effects for this type 
of circuit breakers; that is, the hazard rate (failure rate) increases significantly as the 
system ages. The differences between the two distributions (Weibull and normal) lie not 
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only in the way the failure rates increase, but also in the shape of the associated pdf 
(probability density function) plots.   
One thing in common between the two acceptable “best fits” (Weibull distribution 
and normal distribution) is that, no matter how the failure rate is distributed, the failure 
rates increase as the component ages. This is exactly one of the important features that 
we are seeking, for an application of the entry-time approach in a RIAM based scenario 
for NPPs.  
 
Table 11 
A detailed comparison of A-D numbers and Weibull parameters 









K 0.767 16.452 0.617 4.6 7273 
DS 206 
S 2.789 8.659 0.969 0.99 5536 
K 1.421 5.033 1.293 2.6 5848 
CKTBRK 
HFB3 
S 3.467 43.466 0.74 2.3 7151 
CS 
VSS S 1.515 3.75 0.872 1.18 6078 
TBDP S 0.749 4.448 0.674 1.56 6238 MOTOR 
FTYPE 
AN S 3.099 11.722 0.835 1.42 8051 
 
 
Without considering other factors (as will be discussed in detail in Sections 4.3 and 
4.4 below, using the A-D numbers and plot observations), we can see clearly that the 
   
71 
failure rate is not constant for DS 206 Type K circuit breakers . On the contrary, the 
component failure shows some considerable time-dependent features. Similar results 
hold for the other components (cf. Appendix B).  The A-D-statistics for the fits to the 
various distributions are shown in Table 11. 
As we can see from Table 11 that the A-D number using exponential distribution is 
the largest for each type of model; this means that none of the failure distribution for any 
of the models follow an the exponential distribution. However, both the Weibull and 
normal distributions give a good fit, with the normal distribution seeming slightly 
preferable.  Also, a comparison of the Weibull parameters given in Table 11 with those 
in Table 8 shows that the parameters acquired by fitting the failure with Weibull 
distributions agree with the “typical” Weibull parameters as suggested by the Barringer 
website (see also footnote 4) for both circuit breaker and motor. 
Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that the INPO-EPIX database is capable of 
providing appropriate failure rates for use within the entry-time model developed in the 
preceding Chapters II and III, and that circuit breakers and motors provide instances of 
the behavior of interest (time-dependent failure rates).  In the following sections we 
therefore pursue more detailed parameter measures and comparisons, to choose both 
which distribution to use in the entry-time applications, and an appropriate “target 
system” for application of the entry-time methodology.   
4.3 Selection of Target System (Main Generator) 
The applicability of the EPIX database has been demonstrated in the preceding 
section. The next step is to identify a system suitable for entry-time applications, and for 
   
72 
which adequate data exist.  Identification of such a “target system” is the objective of 
this section. 
As stated in Chapter I, one of the requirements of the RIAM application is that the 
failure of the system will increase system risk or generation risk, which means that the 
system is either safety related or generation-risk related. We choose the main generators 
as an application in this dissertation to demonstrate the applicability of the entry-time 
approach to any RIAM based applications in NPPs.  Their failure constitutes a 
generation risk. An introduction to the main generator and its auxiliary systems is found 
in Section 5.1 below. 
This choice is partially motivated by availability of detailed information about main 
generators from STP (South Texas Project Nuclear Power Plant), where there have been 
some recent issues with the main generators.  A further reason is existence, in the EPIX 
database, of extensive failure data for main generators, including those at STP.   
As mentioned in the preceding section the hazard rate extracted from the failure data 
is identical to the failure rate needed for use in the entry-time model.  Further study of 
the failure data from the EPIX database for the main generator shows that the hazard 
function obtained from the data analysis do display aging (time-dependent, cf. Sections 
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6), which is an important factor for a demonstration of the utility of the 
entry-time model. 
Because of the generation-risk related property of the main generators, it is almost 
certain that any failure will be discovered immediately by plant personnel, once it occurs. 
Therefore, the failure data queried from the EPIX database (e.g. Failure discovery data, 
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estimated age at failure etc.) is expected to very closely reflect the actual time when a 
failure occurred.  
In the following sections, the failure data for main generators acquired from the 
EPIX database is analyzed using Minitab software to extract failure distribution and 
further failure rates to be used in the entry-time application. Due to the generation risk 
related properties of generator failures, in the analysis, only the failures that resulted in 
significant power generation loss are queried from the EPIX database. Because those 
failures can, and in fact normally do, lead to 100% power loss, which is equivalent to 
reactor trip, we name those failures as “trip-equivalent failures”. Just as in the preceding 
section, we use the MiniTab software to fit the failure data into different distributions to 
see which best fits the failure data; this “best fit” distribution will be subsequently used 
in the entry-time model.  
This analysis is performed in the following way: First, we choose three different 
datasets of main generator failure records (all Westinghouse-manufactured, all 
Westinghouse-manufactured serial numbers similar to STP, STP only). Then for each 
dataset, we use two different data interpretation methods to fit the failure dataset to each 
of the Weibull and lognormal distributions. The methodological issues for extraction of 
failure rates from EPIX database using MiniTab software will be discussed in the 
following Section 4.4 and the results will be presented in the subsequent Section 4.5. 
4.4 Techniques for Extraction of Failure Rates: Methodological Issues  
In this section the hazard function from a “best fit” distribution will be used to 
extract failure rates needed for application of the entry-time methodology. Those are the 
   
74 
primary results needed from empirical data for application of entry-time technique. 
When we fit the different datasets extracted from the EPIX database with different 
distributions, to find the best fit for the failure data, the following assumptions are 
applied: a) All subsequent failures are independent of the prior failures; b) When a 
system is repaired (not a full system replacement) from a failure, the system is “as-good-
as-old” so that any aging effects persist and the failure rates are still dominated by aging 
effects, if any. 
In this section, three different datasets of main generator failure records (all 
Westinghouse-manufactured, all Westinghouse-manufactured serial numbers similar to 
STP, STP only) are extracted from the EPIX database; the corresponding query criteria 
are discussed in Subsection 4.4.1. In Subsection 4.4.2, the data acquired from the 
database are interpreted according with different plant procedures. Also the different 
“censoring schemes” used in MiniTab are discussed in Subsection 4.4.2. 
4.4.1 Data Selection 
As discussed in Section 4.3, the choice of main generator is partially motivated by 
availability of detailed information about main generators from STP (South Texas 
Project Nuclear Power Plant), where there have been some recent issues with the main 
generators. We therefore wish, in the application of entry-time model, to include the 
failure data for STP main generators. When extracting data from the database, analyzing 
the fit of the data to different distributions, we have presumed that the failure of 
components/systems with same or similar model numbers tend to follow same type of 
distributions. The STP main generators are manufactured by Westinghouse, whose main 
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generators are also used in some other utilities; however, the specific model used at STP 
is rarely used elsewhere. In an effort to obtain good statistical results, we therefore have 
three options in terms of the nature of the failure data to e extracted from the EPIX 
database. We describe the options in order of largest amount of data (least restrictive) to 
smallest amount of data (most restrictive) in the following paragraphs.  
The first option is to query all the failure records from the EPIX database for main 
generators manufactured by Westinghouse (including STP main generators), and we 
name this dataset as “Westinghouse Dataset” (Dataset 1). Among the three options or 
search criteria, this option is the least restrictive and hence gives the largest amount of 
data. However, due to the “mixture” of data (different model numbers) from different 
sources (different nuclear power plants and different units), the failure data may not fit 
any type of distribution well; this effect will be seen in the results presented in Section 
4.5. 
The second option is to query all the failure records for main generators 
manufactured by Westinghouse that have model numbers similar to those of the STP 
main generators (i.e. only the last few digits of the model numbers are different, which 
implies similar design with only slightly differences),  and we name this dataset as 
“Model Specified Dataset” (Dataset 2).  As mentioned earlier in this section, we presume 
that the failures of components/systems with same or similar model numbers tend to 
follow the same distribution. Therefore, “Model Specified Dataset” is able to give 
adequate amount of “samples” (failure records) and it is feasible to generate a failure 
distribution that all the failure data tend to follow using the data in this dataset. The 
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advantage of using “Model Specified Dataset” is that selecting more data has the 
advantage of giving better statistics by including systems that are dissimilar, in some 
respect, to those at STP. However, the disadvantage of it is that the distribution acquired 
from the dataset might tend to deviate from the distribution for the failure of STP main 
generators. 
Comparing to the two options above, the last option is to query the failure records 
for main generator with STP model number without considering failures at other plants, 
and we name this dataset as “STP-only Dataset” (Dataset 3) Apparently the failure 
records from a single nuclear power plant (2 individual units) may not provide sufficient 
sample size to show good statistical results, and hence give a failure distribution that fits 
well the failure data in this dataset, as shown in the following section of this chapter. 
However, this is only a hypothesis not a demonstration and there is future work that 
ultimately is needed in this regard, but that is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
In the following Subsection 4.4.2, the datasets specified in this section will be 
interpreted in accord with different assumed operational procedures, e.g. discovery by 
inspection and discovery by alarm. The corresponding MiniTab treatment of each of 
these interpretations is also given in the following subsection. 
4.4.2 Data Interpretation 
In this subsection, the data from the acquired from the EPIX database using SQL 
queries are interpreted in two different ways in accordance with two different 
operational procedures at nuclear power plants and the way the failures were discovered. 
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Data in “Model Specified Dataset” as queried from the EPIX database can be found 
in Table 12 and the data in the “Westinghouse Dataset” can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 12 gives the estimated age at failure for all main generators that have similar 
model number to those at STP.  
When querying the EPIX database to obtain the data in Table 12, first the main 
generator model number for STP main generators was acquired by querying the “Device 
Table”, and then the main generators with same or similar model numbers as that at STP 
were queried from the same table. After that, the detailed failure information including 
“estimated age at failure”, “failure discovery data” and other information were extracted 
from the database through a series of queries involving several tables and using the 
inner-join technique for SQL.  
In general, and absent further detailed information, there are two possible 
interpretations of an observation of a single failure event (e.g. the failure event 
corresponding to any single datum in Table 12). Such an event can be discovered some 
time after the failure, or it can be discovered immediately after the incident. Those two 
types of observation correspond to two different operational procedures, which we 
indicate respectively as “discovery by inspection” and “discovery by alarm.” More 
generally, the failures from any dataset discussed in the previous subsection are a 
mixture of the two different types of observations, i.e., they can be discovered by 
inspection (only know the failure occurred before this inspection and after the previous 
one) or they can be discovered by alarm (exact failure time). However, from the 
information in the EPIX database per se, it is not feasible to ascertain which type of 
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observation a single failure corresponds to. In order to better understand a particular 
failure, individuals, documents or reports associated with that failure must be consulted.  
This is not feasible for the current research. 
Therefore, we choose to assume each of the two types of observations for each 
dataset.  That is, the failure data from each dataset are treated by each of the “discovered 
by inspection” procedure or the “discovered by alarm” procedures.   The way in which 
each of these procedures is embodied in the MiniTab software will now be discussed. 
In MiniTab software, there are three different types of censoring schemes. (For a 
detailed explanation of “censoring,” and examples of these censoring schemes, please 
see Appendix D.).  These three schemes are “Right Censored”, “Left Censored” and 
“Interval Censored”. Those three types of censoring schemes correspond to three 
different types of observations: When we only know that the failure occurred after a 
particular time, the “Right Censored” scheme is applied; when it is only known that the 
failure occurred before a particular time, the datum is identified as “Left Censored” 
scheme is used; when we know that the failure occurred between two particular times, 
the “Interval Censored” scheme is applied. And when the failures are exact, no censoring 
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Table 12  




























Corresponding to the interpretation of plant procedure, “Interval Censored” data will 
be used in the MiniTab when the failure is assumed to be discovered by inspection 
because we know the failure occurred between two individual inspections; 
“noncensored” data (exact failure data) will be used when the failure is assumed to be 
discovered by alarm. 
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As mentioned in the preceding subsection, because of the generation-risk related 
property of the main generators, it is almost certain that any failure will be discovered 
immediately by plant personnel, once it occurs. This presumably is why, as shown in the 
Section 4.5, the “exact failure data” consistently provides the best fit for the failure data.  
Thus we will ultimately choose to use failure data represented as noncensored. 
To summarize:  We have three different datasets (Westinghouse, Model Specified 
and STP-only), two interpretations (discovery by inspection and discovery by alarm) and 
three different parametric distributions (exponential, lognormal and Weibull).  
Collectively this corresponds to 3×2×3=18 different combinations of choices.  From the 
analysis in Section 4.2, we have drawn the conclusion that failure rate for components 
are not ell represented by constant failure rates, which correspond to exponential 
distributions. A detailed analysis (not shown here) of the main generator failure data 
confirms that conclusion for our target system (main generators). Therefore, in the 
following section only distribution plots using the Weibull and lognormal distributions 
are displayed, which reduces the number of combinations to 12. Further, in the analysis 
of the following section, lognormal instead of normal distributions are used, because 
sometimes the normal distribution can predict failures at negative times, which are not 
possible in practice.  
4.5 Techniques for Extraction of Failure Rates: Comparison of Results  
In the preceding section, the methodological issues of extracting failure rates from 
EPIX for the application of entry-time model were discussed. In this section we will 
compare results for the three datasets acquired from the database using different query
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criteria, with censored or non-censored data as needed for different observations. The 
results are presented in the order of dataset; for each dataset, it is ordered by type of 
observation; and for each observation we present and discuss the fit to first the Weibull, 
then the lognormal distribution. 
4.5.1 Results for Westinghouse-manufactured Main Generators 
The data in this dataset were queried from the EPIX database using the following 
search criteria: Search the failure records for Main Generators manufactured by 
Westinghouse. A report consisting of 100 records in total is generated by this query (see 
Appendix C for the complete report). 
In the following, we first (subsubsection 1) treat the data by “discovery by 
inspection” scheme, defined as follows:  Within the MiniTab formatting, the first failure 
is labeled “Left censored,” and the last failure is labeled “Right censored.”   These 
choices are based on the assumption that the first failure happened before the first 
inspection and the failures following the last one will occur some time after it.   All 
others failures are labeled as, “Interval censored” which corresponds to the assumption 
that failure occurred some time before discovery and after the preceding discovery of a 
failure at the same plant. Second (subsubsection 2), the data will be treated as “discovery 
by alarm” observations, where all failures are recorded as exact within their MiniTab 
representation, so that no censored data are used.  
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4.5.1.1 Results for Westinghouse-manufactured Main Generators Using “Discovery by 
Inspection” Scheme 
In Figure 17, a two-parameter Weibull distribution is used to fit the failure data in 
the Westinghouse dataset, assuming discovery by inspection, with left censoring  prior to 
first discovery, right censoring subsequent to last and all others interval censored.   The 
plot at upper right shows that, although most of the data points fall around the 
percentage plot (see also footnote 7) line, there are some points, especially at earlier 
times and at later times, that depart significantly from the percentage plot.  This is 
presumably reflected in the relatively large A-D number (4.269). 
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Figure 17. Two-parameter Weibull distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
inspection” scheme for Dataset 1  
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The corresponding results for the lognormal fit to the failure data in this group, 
using “discovery by inspection” is shown in Figure 18. As in the Weibull distribution 
plot in Figure 17, we can see that although most of the data points fall around the 
percentage plot (see also footnote 7) line, there are some points, especially at early time 
and later time, that depart from the percentage plot; however, now the A-D number is 
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Figure 18. Two-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
inspection” scheme for Dataset 1 
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It can be seen from the lower right plot hazard plot in Figure 18 that the failure rate 
increases first and then decrease eventually after some peak point, which rarely happens 
for component degradation. This phenomenon is known as the “Fountain of Youth” (or 
“Ponce de Leon”) effect, which is a well-know deficiency of lognormal distributions. 
However, the discussion in Section 5.3 shows that the choice of lognormal or Weibull 
distribution does not change the results much. The explanation of this phenomenon 
should be further explored in future research, but here the discussion of the reason is out 
of the scope of the topic in this section.  
4.5.1.2 Results for Westinghouse-manufactured Main Generators Using “Discovery by 
Alarm, with No Censoring” Scheme 
In this section, instead of using the “discovery by inspection” scheme, the same 
failure data from “Westinghouse Dataset” are tested using the “discovery by alarm, no 
censoring” scheme, which assumes all failures were discovered by alarm and hence the 
plant personnel were notified immediately.  
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Figure 19. Two-parameter Weibull distribution overview plot using “discovery by alarm, 
with no censoring” scheme for Dataset 1 
The results for the Weibull distribution are shown in Figure 19.  The A-D number 
greater than 4.5 suggests the Weibull distribution does not provide a good fit.  As 
compared to the Weibull distribution with “discovery by inspection” scheme in Figure 
17, the A-D number is even larger using the discovery by alarm scheme than under the 
discovery by inspection approach. 
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Figure 20. Two-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
alarm, with no censoring” scheme for Dataset 1 
 
The lognormal distribution plot using “discovery by alarm, with no censoring” 
scheme is shown in Figure 20. As for the discovery by inspection scheme, the lognormal 
distribution fits the failure data better than the Weibull distribution; as judged by A-D 
numbers and probability plots.  Also as for the discovery by inspection scheme, the 
lognormal failure rate ultimately decreases.  As previously mentioned, explanation of 
this phenomenon should be further explored in future research, but here the discussion of 
the reason is out of the scope of the topic in this section.  
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In Figures 21 and 22 the 95% probability plots with discovery by alarm are given in 



































Figure 21. 95% probability plot using Weibull distribution with exact failures for 
 Dataset 1 
Comparing the probability plot using Weibull distribution (Figure 21) and the one 
using lognormal distribution (Figure 22), it is easy to see the obvious difference, by 
inspection. More points fall outside the 95% region in the Weibull distribution then in 
the lognormal distribution. Also, a comparison of A-D numbers for 95% probability 
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plots confirms that the lognormal distribution is a better fit than the Weibull distribution 



































Figure 22.  95% probability plot using lognormal distribution with exact failures for 
Dataset 1 
4.5.2 Results for Westinghouse-manufactured Main Generators Similar to Those 
Models Used at STP 
Similarly, we can plot different distributions using the two data interpretation 
schemes for data in “Model Specified Dataset”. In this data-selection method only 
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failure records for main generators manufactured by Westinghouse and with similar 
model number as those for STP were extracted from the database.  The hope is that this 
will yield a tighter and more coherent distribution of the failure data than was found in 
the preceding data-selection approach.  
The search criterion for this dataset is: Search the failure records for main generators 
manufactured by Westinghouse and with similar model number as that of STP. The 24 
resulting records are shown in Table 12. 
As for the data in “Westinghouse Dataset”, in the following section we first 
(subsubsection 1) treat these data by “discovery by inspection” observation, and then 
(subsubsection 2) following the “discovery by alarm” assumption, wherein all failures 
are exact and no censored data is used.  
4.5.2.1 Results for Westinghouse-manufactured Main Generators Similar to Those at 
STP Using “Discovery by Inspection” Scheme 
Similarly, the failure data is first fit to a (two-parameter) Weibull distribution 
(Figure 23). The first overall observation of the plots is that with fewer data points and 
similar model numbers, the data fit into Weibull distribution very well comparing to 
those in the “Westinghouse Dataset” (mixed data from the same manufacturer). Also a 
smaller A-D number (1.429, vs. 4.269) suggests that the failure data agree fit a Weibull 
distribution well. 
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Figure 23. Two-parameter Weibull distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
inspection” scheme for Dataset 2 
 
Figure 24 is the lognormal distribution using the data in this group. Just as the 
Weibull distribution above (Figure 23), almost all the points fall near the probability plot 
line, which means that the (best-fit) distribution agrees with the actual failure data 
distribution. A comparison of A-D numbers shows that the lognormal distribution is a 
better fit than Weibull because the A-D number is smaller (1.179, vs. 1.429). 
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Figure 24. Two-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
inspection” scheme for Dataset 2 
 
A small A-D number (1.179) in the lognormal distribution plot (Figure 24) shows 
the accuracy of the data fit to this distribution. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient9 of 
0.981, which is close to one (1), tends to confirm this conclusion. 
                                                 
9
 The Pearson correlation measures the strength of the linear relationship between the X and Y variables 
on a probability plot. The correlation will range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating a better 
fitting distribution. 
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4.5.2.2 Results for Westinghouse-manufactured Main Generators Similar to Those at 
STP Using “Discovery by Alarm, with No Censoring” Scheme 
In this section, instead of using the “discovery by inspection” scheme, the same 
failure data from “Model Specified Dataset” are tested using the “discovery by alarm” 
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Figure 25. Two-parameter Weibull distribution overview plot using “discovery by alarm, 
with no censoring” scheme for Dataset 2 
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Figure 25 and Figure 26 are plots using the two-parameter Weibull distribution and 
the lognormal distribution, respectively. The Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the 
two distributions are both 0.981. The A-D number of the latter (0.784) is smaller than 
that of the former (1.125), which means that the lognormal distribution is a better fit than 
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Figure 26. Two-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
alarm, with no censoring” scheme for Dataset 2 
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In Figures 27 and Figure 28, the 95% probability plots with exact failure data are 
given respectively for the Weibull and lognormal distributions, to give an alternative 



































Figure 27. 95% probability plot using Weibull distribution with exact failures for 
 Dataset 2 
 
Similarly to the probability plot in the “overview” plots, the 95% probability plot 
gives the 95% confidence region and the corresponding A-D number is a measure of 
how closely the data points fall into this region rather than on a single line as the 
probability plot in the “overview” plots. Hence by inspection of Figure 27 and Figure 28, 
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one can easily find that all the points fall into this 95% probability region for both of the 
plots. Meanwhile, the A-D numbers in both distributions are much smaller than all 
others in the plots for the all-Westinghouse dataset, which suggests that the failure data 
in “Model Specified Dataset” can fit into both Weibull and lognormal distributions very 


































Figure 28. 95% probability plot using lognormal distribution with exact failures for 
Dataset 2 
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4.5.3 Results for STP Main Generators 
In the following, we plot different distributions using the two data interpretation 
schemes for data in “STP-only Dataset”. In this data-selection method only failure 
records for main generators at STP were extracted from the database.   
As for the other two datasets, in this subsection, we first (Subsubsection 4.5.3.1) 
treat the data as representing “discovery by inspection” observations.  Following that, 
the data will be treated following the “discovery by alarm” scheme, in which all failures 
are exact and no censored data is used.  
The results for this dataset “STP-only Dataset” are given in Table 13. 
 
Table 13  
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Table 13 shows the estimated age at failure for main generator failures at STP. A 
close look at the data highlighted in the table (also in red color) reveals that there were 
some failures occurred in a very short time period. A detailed study of the STP 
documents for those failures shows that the third failure (day 4011) in the highlighted 
region results from incorrect maintenance of the previous failure (day 4006).  Therefore 
the two failures are not independent, so that the “bad as old” assumption is invalid.  The 
“good as new” assumption might be true, but would need to allow for infant mortality in 
the failure mode that was attempted to repair.  An entry time model could accommodate 
that, but would need to allow for multiple entry times, for each failure mode. This 
possibility will be further discussed in the concluding Chapter VI. 
4.5.3.1 Results for STP Main Generators Using “Discovery by Inspection” Scheme 
Using the failure with STP main generator model, the Weibull distribution plots, 
with "discovery by inspection” scheme, are given in Figure 29.  
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Figure 29. Two-parameter Weibull distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
inspection” scheme for Dataset 3 
 
Comparing to its “counterpart” plot in Figure 23 which plots all the failure data with 
similar model number, the A-D number in this plot is much larger (3.310 vs. 1.429). The 
reason for that probably lies in the fact the limited sample space (amount of failure data) 
is not sufficient to provide good statistics. 
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Figure 30. Two-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
inspection” scheme for Dataset 3 
 
With comparison to Figure 29, the lognormal distribution plots in Figure 30 shows a 
slight decrease in A-D numbers (2.279 vs. 3.310) and increase in Pearson Correlation 
number (0.938 vs. 0.901). However, the distribution fit is not as good as in “Model 
Specified Dataset” (i.e., all Westinghouse-manufactured generators with similar or same 
model number to those at STP; cf. Figure 24). 
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4.5.3.2 Results for STP Main Generators Using “Discovery by Alarm, with No 
Censoring” Scheme 
In this subsubsection, instead of using the “discovery by inspection” scheme, the 
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Figure 31. Two-parameter Weibull distribution overview plot using “discovery by alarm, 
with no censoring” scheme for Dataset 3 
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With comparison to Figure 29, where the “discovery by inspection” scheme is 
applied, the Weibull distribution plot in Figure 31 which uses “discovery by alarm, with 
no censoring” scheme has a larger A-D number and a smaller Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient, and this means that the “discovery by inspection” scheme provides a better 
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Figure 32. Two-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot using “discovery by 
alarm, with no censoring” scheme for Dataset 3 
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Just as the Weibull distribution plot in Figure 31, with comparison to Figure 30 
where the “discovery by inspection” scheme is applied, the lognormal distribution plot in 
Figure 32, which uses “discovery by alarm, with no censoring” scheme has a smaller A-
D number and a larger Pearson correlation coefficient. 
In the following, the 95% probability plots with exact failure data are given in both 

































Figure 33. 95% probability plot using Weibull distribution with exact failures for  
Dataset 3 
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As can be seen from the two 95% probability plots, using Weibull (Figure 33) and 
lognormal (Figure 34) distributions, almost all the data points fall into the 95% plot 
region. However, there are only a few data that fall around the center line; most of the 
data fall close to the boundary. A detailed comparison of A-D numbers of censoring 
































Figure 34. 95% probability plot using lognormal distribution with exact failures for 
Dataset 3 
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4.5.4 Summary of Results 
We have, in the preceding sections, tested the three datasets using two different data 
interpretation schemes with two different distributions, for a total of 12 cases. In this 
section, the results from those analyses are presented and compared to find the “best” 
distribution and the best data interpretation scheme. 
Using both A-D number and Pearson correlation coefficient as standards in selecting 
the distribution for the main generator failure data, one can summarize the preceding 
results in this section as follows: 
1) Presumably because of the “mixture feature” of failure data for different model 
numbers, even though they are from the same manufacturer, the data in the first 
Dataset (all main generators that are manufactured by Westinghouse) do not fit 
into any distribution as well as the other two groups. The reason for that 
presumably is that different models have different failure distribution (e.g. 
mixture of normal distributions and Weibull distributions), so that the mixture of 
different distributions does not fit well (large A-D number) to any single simple 
parametric statistical distribution. 
2) For failure records that contain only STP model number (there are no other NPPs 
using main generators of the exact model number as STP), due to the limited data 
points (fewer than 20 failure points), the sample space is insufficient to provide 
good statistics. Also because of the connections between some failures as 
discussed in the preceding section, the data in this dataset is not good enough for 
prediction purposes. 
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3) However, the failure data from model numbers that are similar to STP model 
show some strong statistical features to predict the time-dependent failure rate for 
main generator and do future performance analysis for the following reasons: 
a. The sample space is sufficiently large to permit meaningful statistical 
analysis 
b. Because the search criterion is set by “similar models” and “same 
manufacturer”, the components/systems in this dataset tend to have 
similar failure distributions. Hence when they are put together, they fit 
into some distributions very well. 
From this summary, we therefore draw the tentative conclusion that the data in 
“Model Specified Dataset” (i.e. the data searched by the criteria: “Similar model 
number” and “same manufacturer”) is preferable for extracting the failure rates needed 
for application of the entry-time model to main generators. 
More detailed comparison of the A-D numbers and Pearson correlation coefficient s 
can be found in the following Table 14.  (The results for the exponential distribution are 
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Table 14  






Type10 Distribution Type A-D Number Pearson Corr. 
Weibull 4.269 0.965 
Exponential 21.247 N/A discovery by inspection 
lognormal 1.262 0.975 
Weibull 4.544 0.965 
Exponential 22.844 N/A 
1 100 
discovery by 
alarm, with no 
censoring  lognormal 1.173 0.975 
Weibull 1.429 0.982 
Exponential 13.812 N/A discovery by inspection 
lognormal 1.179 0.981 
Weibull 1.125 0.981 
Exponential 15.151 N/A 
2 25 
discovery by 
alarm, with no 
censoring  lognormal 0.784 0.981 
Weibull 3.310 0.901 
Exponential 7.885 N/A discovery by inspection 
lognormal 2.279 0.938 
Weibull 2.278 0.900 






alarm, with no 
censoring  lognormal 1.548 0.943 
 
 
As conclusion, data in “Model Specified Dataset” (All Westinghouse-manufactured 
main generators similar to those at STP generators) will be used for further analysis and 
the P discovery by alarm, with no censoring” scheme will be applied to the analysis. 
Further detailed analysis will be carried out in the following section, to generate time-
                                                 
10
 See examples in appendix D for details of the different data censoring procedures. 
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dependent failure rates and the corresponding distribution(s). These will then be 
employed in Chapter V, to generate various predictions via the entry-time model of the 
preceding chapters. 
4.6 Further Main Generator Failure Data Analysis 
Based on the analysis done in the preceding section, data from failure of similar 
model numbers (“Model Specified Dataset”) will be used in this section.  Further, the 
detailed analysis of this section will be based on the assumption these data represent 
using “discovery by alarm, with no censoring” scheme based on the comparison of A-D 
numbers and Pearson correlation numbers. 
In this section, rather than two-parameter Weibull and two-parameter lognormal 
distributions, we use the three-parameter versions of these two distributions to fit the 
indicated data.  The hope is that this will provide further precision for the data fitting. 
Comparing to the two-parameter Weibull and two-parameter lognormal distributions, the 
three-parameter versions of these two distributions have a location parameter (also 
known as “threshold”). The threshold is a shift of the distribution away from 0. A 
negative threshold shifts the distribution to the left of 0, and a positive threshold shifts 
the distribution to the right of 0. All failure data points must correspond to a time greater 
than the threshold. The probability density functions of three-parameter lognormal 
distribution and three-parameter Weibull distribution can be seen in the following 
equations respectively (The corresponding two-parameter distributions are similar to the 
three-parameter ones, but the threshold λ  is zero): 














−   
 
where µ is the location parameter, σ is the scale parameter and λ is the threshold 
parameter for the (three-parameter) lognormal distribution.  
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where α is the scale parameter, β  is the shape parameter and λ is the threshold 
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Figure 35. Three-parameter Weibull distribution plot using “discovery by alarm, with no 
censoring” scheme 
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Figure 35 is a distribution overview plot of the data in “Model Specified Dataset” 
using “discovery by alarm, with no censoring” scheme for three-parameter Weibull 
distribution. With a small A-D number (0.910) and the Pearson correlation coefficient 
(0.985) close to one, the distribution plot agrees well with the actual failure data. A 
comparison with the corresponding two-parameter Weibull distribution (cf. Figure 25) 
shows that the three-parameter Weibull gives a better fit (A-D number 0.789, Pearson 
correlation 0.986) than the two-parameter Weibull distribution, which has a A-D number 






































































Figure 36. Three-parameter lognormal distribution plot using “discovery by alarm, with 
no censoring” scheme 
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Figure 36 shows the three-parameter lognormal distribution plot. As we can see 
from the parameter table that the A-D number is small and the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is close to one, which means that this distribution can be a good fit of the 
dataset. However, the threshold value in the table is negative. A negative threshold shifts 
the distribution to the left of 0, and all data must be greater than the threshold. Therefore 
the negative threshold suggests that there are some negative values in the data 






































Figure 37. 95% probability plot with three-parameter Weibull distribution 
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The 95% probability plots are given for both the three-parameter Weibull (Figure 37) 
and three-parameter lognormal distributions (Figure 38). From the plots we can see that 
all the data points fall into the 95% probability region. 
Same as the three-parameter lognormal distribution overview plot give in Figure 36, 
the 95% probability plot using three-parameter lognormal distribution in Figure 38 also 
presents negative threshold. Since the negative threshold number has some disadvantage 
for this particular application, the two-parameter three-parameter lognormal distribution 



































Figure 38. 95% probability plot with three-parameter lognormal distribution 
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The comparison of all the parameters using the four different distributions is listed 
in Table 15 below. 
 
Table 15  
Comparison of different parameters for Weibull and lognormal distributions, with two 
and three parameters 
Data 
Distribution 





Weibull 1.125 0.981 0.489 0.218 
lognormal 0.784 0.981 0.301 0.553 
3-Parameter 
Weibull 
0.910 0.985 0.338 0.456 
3-Parameter 
lognormal 
0.789 0.986 0.315 N/A 
 
 
Please note here that the P-value for 3-parameter lognormal distribution is 
represented by an asterisk as seen in Figure 38. According to the manual for Minitab 
software, “An asterisk appears in place of a p-value for the 3-parameter lognormal, 3-
parameter gamma, and 3-parameter loglogistic distributions. The asterisk indicates that 
MiniTab cannot calculate a p-value for that distribution.” 
The OSL (observed significance level) probability [34] therefore is now used for 
testing the distributions listed above. If 0.05OSL <  then the distribution assumption is 
                                                 
11
 Used in hypothesis tests to help decide whether to reject or fail to reject a null hypothesis. The p-value is 
the probability of obtaining a test statistic that is at least as extreme as the actual calculated value, if the 
null hypothesis is true. A commonly used cut-off value for the p-value is 0.05. For example, if the 
calculated p-value of a test statistic is less than 0.05, you reject the null hypothesis. 
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rejected and the error committed in so doing is less than 5%.The OSL formula is given 
by: 
* *1/{1 exp[ 0.1 1.24 ln( ) 4.48( )]}OSL AD AD= + − + +  
where 
* (1 0.2 / )AD n AD= +  
and n  is the sample number. 
 
Table 16  














Weibull 1.125 1.0817 0.0078 0.5086 0.2075 
lognormal 0.784 0.7538 0.0509 0.3130 0.5345 
3-Parameter 
Weibull 0.910 0.8750 0.0252 0.3515 0.4556 
3-Parameter 
lognormal 0.789 0.7587 0.0494 0.3276 0.5040 
 
 
From Table 16, we can see that only the OSL for two-parameter lognormal 
distribution is greater than 0.05.  According to the rule quoted above, “If 0.05OSL <  
then the distribution assumption is rejected and the error committed is less than 5%”, the 
lognormal distribution is selected as the best fit for data in group 2. Also the 
corresponding OSL number for 95% probability plot is the largest comparing to other 
values. Therefore, the best fit for the data in group 2 with right censoring is two-
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parameter lognormal distribution. A further discussion of how the choice of distributions 
can affect the results is given in Subsection 5.3. 
In the application of the following Chapter V, the unit of time will be years instead 
of days.  We therefore plot the corresponding data in group two with year as unit in 
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Table 17  
Parameters that will be used for further analysis 
Parameter Name Shape Scale 
Parameter Value 2.49387 0.201691 
 
In the following Chapter V, the failure distribution data (Table 17) extracted from 
the analysis of this chapter will be applied to the entry-time model, to provide a 
generation-risk assessment for main generators. 
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CHAPTER V 
APPLICATION OF ENTRY-TIME MODEL TO NPP APPLICATIONS 
In Chapter III the entry-time approach is verified by comparison to semi-analytical 
results and simulations. In Chapter IV the time-dependent data failure-rate data 
necessary to application of the entry-time methodology are extracted, for certain classes 
of main generators, from the corresponding failure data found in the INPO-EPIX 
database. In this chapter, the potential real-world application of the entry-time approach 
is illustrated by way of realistic questions related to the maintenance of main generators 
in nuclear power plants. 
In Section 5.1, the main functions and structures of the main generator system are 
introduced, followed by the state definitions and assumptions underlying the subsequent 
entry-time analysis of main generators in Section 5.2. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, the entry-
time approach is applied to the issue of optimizing maintenance policies for main 
generators. This is done in two separate parts: reliability performance analysis (Section 
5.3) and financial analysis (Section 5.4). In the reliability analysis, the time-varying 
system-state probabilities are determined under different preventive maintenance 
policies; in the financial analysis, the net present value (NPV) of cost and other financial 
data are calculated from the entry-time probability analysis, for the various maintenance 
policies, and the cost-optimal maintenance policy is determined.  In Section 5.5, possible 
application of the entry-time model to PRA/GRA analysis is outlined as a potential 
direction for future research in this field. 
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5.1 Introduction to the Main Generator System 
The introduction of the main generator is mainly sourced from NPP system 
notebooks. The function of main generators is to produce electrical power, at rated 
voltage and frequency, to be delivered to the electrical power grid and consumers. This 
is accomplished by using electromagnetic induction to convert mechanical energy, as 
delivered to the generator rotor from the system turbine, into electrical energy.  This 
energy is delivered in MWe (megawatts electric), at the appropriate power rotor, as 
measured at the main generator terminals and allowing for the power requirements of the 
plant.  The generator voltage is normally 20-22 kilovolts. The frequency is either 50 or 
60 cycles per second, depending on the needs of the power grid and consumers. This 
frequency is determined by the rotating speed of the generator which is between 1500 
and 3600 revolutions per second. 
The generator consists of an exciter, a stator and rotor. The exciter keeps a low 
current going through the wires of the rotor. When this rotor turns, the magnetic field 
associated with this rotor current induces a voltage in the stator. The generator also has a 
voltage-regulator that maintains the voltage within acceptable limits.  
For the generators to work properly, the following auxiliary equipment is required: 
excitation system, hydrogen gas control system, seal oil system and stator cooling-water 
system. 
The function of the excitation system is to control the magnetizing current to the 
rotor winding. This control is obtained by fast-acting automatic voltage regulators, 
which serves to maintain the generator output voltage. 
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The main generator components (stator winding, stator core and rotor winding) 
require enhanced cooling in order to maintain the temperature rise of electrical insulation 
within acceptable thermal limits and prevent excessive thermal aging. The cooling is 
provided by hydrogen gas control system, seal oil system and stator cooling-water 
system. 
Hydrogen gas is used for cooling of stator core and rotor winding. In order to 
contain the hydrogen within the generator, hydrogen seals are required to prevent 
leakage along the rotating shaft. The hydrogen seals require continuous supply of clean 
degassed oil. This oil is supplied to the seals by a separate seal-oil auxiliary system, 
which includes oil pumps, filters, coolers, along with associated pressure and flow 
controllers. An oil system is used for lubricating the bearings on the generator.  
The main generators may fail due to various component failures. In summary, the 
main generator can fail because of stator, rotator or exciter failures, or it can fail because 
of the failure of one of its many supporting systems, some of which are described above. 
In our analysis, we will focus on failures that lead directly to loss of power generation. 
From perusal of the EPIX database records, we find almost all power generation loss 
(Mwh Loss in the database) comes from failure of rotors. The reason for that is it 
normally takes a longer time for the system to recover once a rotor failure occurs, while 
exciter failure is easier to fix and does not lead to extended power generation loss. 
Comparing to rotor and exciter, the stator has much lower failure rate and hence we can 
ignore the failure of stator.  In fact, no stator failure events are found in the database. 
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As for supporting system failures, sometimes they can lead to power loss due to 
downgraded power generation.  For example, problems with hydrogen cooling will lead 
to loss of power generation, because the generator can not run at full power without 
adequate cooling. However, such problems or supporting system failures do not result in 
full loss of power generation, which means that they do not lead to “reactor trip 
equivalent” type of failures. 
Given this introduction of the main generator system and its possible failures, the 
main objectives of generator maintenance and aging management are respectively: 
• Maintain generator reliability and availability for power generation 
• Ensure generator life expectancy to be comparable to other main unit 
components, such as turbine, steam generators and the reactor. 
In this dissertation, we are mainly focused on the generator maintenance, in order to 
maintain generator reliability and availability for power generation. To reach this 
objective, preventive maintenance is done to the main generator system in NPPs to 
increase the likelihood of reliable performance. Because the cost associated with 
maintenance varies according to different policies, a financial analysis has to be done 
when making maintenance decisions; one industry standard for this purpose is the EPRI 
PMBasis program [28]; however, that program is somewhat qualitative in nature, and 
here we are exploring a prototypical more quantitative approach. 
In the following sections of this chapter, the entry-time model is used to analyze the 
reliability of a main generator system, under different maintenance policies. Definitions 
and the corresponding assumptions are given in Section 5.2, the reliability performance 
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analyses and financial analyses are carried out in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 
respectively. 
5.2 Definition of States and Assumptions 
The components of main generator system and the objective of generator 
maintenance are outlined in the preceding section. To apply the entry-time approach to 
the maintenance of the system, a definition of states appropriate to the objectives of the 
particular analysis is required. (It was already mentioned in Chapter II that the definition 
of states for entry-time model is sufficiently flexible so as to allow for the needs of a 
particular application.) In this section, a definition of states appropriate to analysis of the 
maintenance issues for main generators is given, and the assumptions associated with 
those states are discussed. 
The most important part of the revenue loss is main generator failure, which leads 
directly to reactor trip and hence 100% power generation loss and corresponding losses 
such as repair and O&M costs. Hence in our analysis, we consider the failures that lead 
to 100% power generation losses. For example, a catastrophic failure of the main 
generator leads to a reactor trip; also, once such an unplanned failure happens, it takes 
longer time for the system to be restored (to go back to 100% power generation). For 
example, an unplanned rotor failure may take up to 10 months outage time, given there 
are no spare rotors.  Comparing to the catastrophic failures, a noncatastrophic failure 
may also lead to reactor trip and hence 100% power generation loss, however, it does not 
take much time (sometimes around 10 days or even shorter) for the system to restore 
power generation. 
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When the main generator is in a reduced power state, it does not necessarily trip the 
reactor, hence the corresponding loss is negligible if the down power rate is low 
comparing to the loss due to catastrophic and noncatastrophic failures that will result in 
trip of the reactor. 
With this larger picture in mind, we make the following assumptions for the analysis 
of this chapter:  
1) When considering main generator failures, only “trip-equivalent” (i.e. those 
failures that lead to 100% power generation loss or trip of the reactor) 
catastrophic and noncatastrophic failures will be counted 
2) Even when the system is running in degraded state, i.e. operating with some 
deficiencies, it still generates 100% power 
3) 95% and 5% split in failure rate between noncatastrophic and catastrophic failure 
modes. This assumption is based on the similar analysis done at STP. 
4) When doing preventive maintenance, we consider only the rotor/stator rewind 
which normally takes places every 15 years (for rotor rewind) or 20 years (for 
stator). 
5) After rewinding or replacement, the system is as good as new. 
Hence we define the following system states for the main generator: 
1) State 1: Normal running state with 100% power generation 
2) State 2: Out of service due to preventive maintenance  
3) State 3: Out of service due to noncatastrophic failures  
4) State 4: Out of service due to catastrophic failures  
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The transition relationship among the states is defined as follows: 
• Rewind or replace the system after a fixed replacement period 
r
T   
• After the replacement time 
r
t , the system goes back to state 1  
• The transition rates from state 1 to state 3 and 4 are defined by the failure 
distribution from the previous analysis, according the failure data from 
the INPO-EPIX database, and further there is a 95%/5% split in failure 
rate between noncatastrophic and catastrophic failure modes 
• When the system is repaired after 
nct , it returns from state 3 to state 1 
• When the system is repaired after 
ct , it returns from state 4 to state 1 
• There are no transitions among any other states 
The transition relationship can be seen in the following figure (Figure 40) 
 
 
Figure 40. Transition relationships between states 
 
As we can see from the lognormal distribution overview plots in Figure 41 using the 
data acquired from the analysis in Subsection 4.5.4, because aging does not have a 
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strong effects to the system at a early stage (see the discussion in Section 4.4), the 
probability density function and cumulative distribution function for failures are 
relatively small when age is less than 10 years, but the cdf for failures increase rapidly 
(pdf becomes significantly positive) between 10 and 15 years. Hence it is reasonable to 
draw a tentative conclusion that there is no need to do a routine preventive maintenance 
at earlier stage (for example, 5 or 6 years of the age), as the aging effects have not 
become a big concern (failures are highly unlikely). However, if the infant-mortality is 
considered in the analysis, then preventive maintenance may become important. This 
will be further studied when doing the detailed analysis to the system in the following 
sections (cf. Section 5.3).  
Also according to judgment from engineers at nuclear power plant, the main parts of 
the main generators (for example, rotors) are replaced around every 10 to 15 years.  We 
therefore choose to use replacement period 
r
T  as a parameter to do the following 
analysis; i.e. we choose representative values of 
r
T  as 6, 10, 12, 16 and 20, to assess how 
the failure probability differs as the replacement period 
r
T  changes. In NPPs, when 
doing preventive maintenance, the PM periods likely would be subordinated to refueling 
outages. Here for 12
r
T = , other than the lognormal distribution as chosen from the 
preceding chapter, Weibull distribution is also applied to the analysis to see the effects of 
choice of different distribution. Additionally, the policy of run-to-failure ( )
r
T = ∞  is 
analyzed, and compared to the other policies, for both distribution types. 
 










pdf plot with mu=2.5,sigma=0.2




cdf plot with mu=2.5,sigma=0.2




survival function with mu=2.5,sigma=0.2






hazard rate with mu=2.5,sigma=0.2
 
Figure 41. lognormal distribution overview plots 
 
Current NPPs have been running for decades (for STP, both units have been running 
for almost 20 years).  Most of them have a design life of 40 years and the license may be 
extended to another 20 years. Therefore, most commercial NPPs have a plant life at 
around 50 years. Hence it is reasonable to do a 50-year analysis when doing life-cycle 
management calculations. In the analysis below, a terminal time of 50 years is therefore 
employed. 
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Based on the above, we have the following defined states and parameters for the 
analysis to the main generator system: 
States defined for the main generator system: 
• State 1: Normal running state with 100% power generation 
• State 2: Out of service due to preventive maintenance (100% power loss) 
• State 3: Out of service due to noncatastrophic failures (100% power loss) 
• State 4: Out of service due to catastrophic failures (100% power loss) 
Corresponding cost and revenue information associated with each state will be given 
in Section 5.4, which treats a related financial analysis. When carrying out preventive 
maintenance, the activity typically has been planned in advance, with all parts and 
materials pre-ordered.  Therefore it tends to take a much shorter time than when the 
system needs to be repaired or replaced after an unplanned catastrophic failure. 
Normally preventive maintenance, whether replacement or repair, can be done within 3 
to 4 months, with all parts and components preordered and ready. Therefore, 0.3
r
t =  
years is used as a typical time in the preventive maintenance state (state 2).  In the 
analysis done to the main generator system. However, when a catastrophic failure occurs, 
given there are no spare components to be installed immediately and some big 
components have to be ordered from the manufacturer, it could take up to 1 year to 
replace the failed component/system before the main generator system and the nuclear 
unit are back to service. The system restore time needed for a catastrophic failure varies 
according to the particular failed components of the system, and can be 6 to 12 months. 
Hence it is reasonable to assume the time needed to recover from a catastrophic failure is 
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around tc = 0.8 years. For a noncatastrophic failure, no special components orders are 
required and it takes a relatively shorter time for the system to return to normal running 
state, compared to the time needed for a catastrophic failure. Again, the system restore 
time needed for a noncatastrophic failure also varies according to the failed components 
of the system, and can be 1 to 3 months. A system restore time of  0.2nct =  years is 
applied in the analysis. 
Therefore, we have the following parameters used in the calculation and analysis: 
• Replacement time: 0.3
r
t =  years 
• Noncatastrophic failure repair time: 0.2nct =  years 
• Catastrophic failure repair time: 0.8ct =  years 
• Terminal Calendar time: 50 years 
In the next section, using the lognormal failure (hazard) rate (see also Figure 41 
above), probability plots using different preventive maintenance periods as parameter are 
plotted and compared against each other. Also probability plots using Weibull 
distribution are compared to those from the lognormal distribution, with the same 
preventive maintenance periods applied. 
In the section following that, a financial analysis is described, for different scenarios. 
This includes the net revenue for each state, expected yearly net revenue, standard 
deviation and skewness. Specifically, the NPV (Net Present Value) cost is calculated for 
each case, and the results are applied for decision-making purposes.  
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5.3 System Reliability Analysis 
In this section, system state probabilities are computed, using the entry-time 
methodology previously developed and different preventive maintenance periods as 
parameters. Based on these results, the corresponding system reliability analysis is then 
carried out. 
As can be seen from Figure 41, the probability density function for failure is 
relatively small when time is less than 6 years, but becomes significantly larger between 
10 and 15 years. It reaches a maximum at around the 12th year. In the following analysis, 
we will select some maintenance policies that collectively capture all significant changes 
in this probability density. First, we choose 12
r
T = , when the probability density reaches 
its maximum. Then 10,16
r
T =  are applied to catch the beginning and end, respectively, 
of the significantly large range of values in the probability density. Also 6
r
T = , is tested 
to study the effect of sufficiently frequent to prevent even the beginning of aging effects. 
20
r
T =  is applied to show the impacts of longer maintenance period to the system 
reliability performances. Additionally, 
r
T = ∞  (not shown in the plots below) is applied 
to the entry-time model to demonstrate the run-to-failure policy, which sometimes is 
adopted by plant maintenance personnel for the maintenance of components or systems.  
To start the discussion, we choose 12
r
T =  (i.e. to replace the system every 12 years). 
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Probability plots using lognormal with T
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Figure 42. States probability plots using lognormal distribution, with Tr=12 
 
As can be seen from Figure 42, with a preventive maintenance policy of 
replacement every 12 years the probability of failure (either noncatastrophic or 
catastrophic, i.e. P3 or P4) is always small, but becomes noticeably nonzero around year 
6, and increases out to year 12.  At that point the replacement causes the probability of 
(either type of) failure to decrease sharply.  Further, the probability that the system is in 
preventive maintenance state ( 2P ) increases correspondingly. Note the occasional 
appearance of computed state probabilities greater than one (1) or less than zero (0); 
these phenomena were previously discussed in Subsection 3.2.2. 
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Figure 43. States probability plots using lognormal with Tr=6 
 
Similar to the plots given in Figure 42, state probability plots using the lognormal 
distribution with 6
r
T =  (replace the system every 6 years) are shown in Figure 43.   It 
shows in the figure that the preventive maintenance of the system decreases the 
probability that the system is in failure state (both catastrophic and noncatastrophic 
failures, i.e. 3 4 and P P ) every 6 years. And the probability that the system is in preventive 
maintenance state ( 2P ) increases correspondingly. Before the maintenance, the 
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probability the system is in failure states ( 3 4 and P P ) increases as the system ages. 
Comparing to the policy to replace the system every 12 years, the much shorter 
maintenance period (6 years) has greatly decreased the risk of failure and hence 
increased the system reliability performance. That is, from Figure 43 we can see that 
both 3 4 and P P  are around the magnitude of 10
-4
, while 3 4 and P P  from Figure 42 show a 
magnitude of 10-2. It is clear that the system failure probability with 6-year-period 
maintenance policy is roughly around 1% of the system failure probability with 12-year-
period one. The reason for that is, with a shorter maintenance period, the system was 
replaced before it ages, which thus prevents the aging effects from ever occurring. 
However, when comparing system reliability performance for different maintenance 
policies, we can not judge only based on the failure state probabilities; other factors, 
such as system availability and economic issues, should be taken into account when 
making decisions regarding maintenance and repair policies. The system availability 
performance will be discussed later in this section for different maintenance policies and 
the financial analysis (NPV etc.) will be given in the following section. 
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Figure 44. Probability plots of noncatastrophic failures using lognormal distribution 
 
Figure 44 shows the probability plots for noncatastrophic failure, using preventive 
maintenance time as a parameter. It can be seen from the figure that some of the plots 
overlap with each other and the plot for 20
r
T =  overlaps with all other lines for time 
before 15 years. The reason for that is obvious: Before the preventive maintenance is 
done, the system tends to have the same reliability performance. While after the 
preventive maintenance, the system reliability performance changes accordingly and the 
probability plot lines separate afterwards. From the plots we can see that the shortest 
maintenance period ( 6
r
T = , the blue dash line)) has the smallest probability of failure. 
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With longer and longer maintenance period, as the system ages, the probability that 
system is in the noncatastrophic failure state becomes larger. Normally, when the system 
was replaced, the preventive maintenance action would prevent the aging effects, for 
example, the 10-year-period maintenance policy decreases the failure probability around 
every 10 years. However, when the system was replaced using a 20-year-period 
maintenance policy, the preventive maintenance action did not help a lot in enhancing 
the system reliability performance. As we look back to the lognormal distribution plots 
in Figure 41, it is easy to find out the reason: after 20 years of operation, it is almost 
certain that the system eventually will be in failure state due to the aging effects, hence 
there will not be too much help to do a preventive maintenance at that time.  
Comparing to Figure 44, Figure 45 shows the probability plots for catastrophic 
failures using preventive maintenance time as a parameter. Similarly to the 
noncatastrophic failure plots, we can see from Figure 45 that the shortest maintenance 
period ( 6
r
T = , the blue dash line)) has the smallest probability of failure. However, due 
to the same reason as stated above, when the system was replaced according to the 20-
year-period maintenance policy, the preventive maintenance action did not help a lot in 
enhancing the system reliability performance.  
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Figure 45. Probability plots of catastrophic failures using lognormal distribution 
 
Based on the analysis of Chapter IV, the lognormal distribution was chosen as the 
primary distribution for the reliability performance analysis in the present chapter, with 
different preventive maintenance periods as parameter. However, the probability density 
functions (pdf) and the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) plots using the parameters 
acquired from the failure data in Chapter IV with lognormal distribution and Weibull 
distribution are very identical, as seen in Figure 46. The only significant difference 
between the two distributions is the hazard rate (failure rate) plot as shown in the lower 
right of Figure 46. As discussed in Subsection 4.5.1, due to the differences in the failure 
rates, Weibull distribution is preferred in some studies because the failure rate for this 
   
134 
distribution follows natural observations better than that for lognormal distribution. 
However, the study in this section shows that there is no significant difference in the 
results when using Weibull or lognormal distributions given that they both fit the failure 
data well. 
 






























Figure 46. Comparison of reliability performance of lognormal and Weibull distributions 
 
It is easy to see from the plot that the hazard rates of the two are quantitatively 
comparable roughly before 13 years but the difference between the two increases 
dramatically after that point. For Weibull distribution, the hazard rate increases faster 
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than that of the lognormal distribution. Some may argue that the Weibull distribution is a 
more “reasonable choice” for reliability analysis because it tends to be consistent with 
what is observed from aging effects, but others may prefer using lognormal distribution 
because it takes into account the “infant mortality” feature (the failure rates tends to 
increase first and then decrease. cf. Figure 18 ) which can be often found in system and 
component failure.  
Then it comes to the following question: When doing system reliability performance 
analysis, which distribution is preferable, lognormal distribution or Weibull distribution, 
or does perhaps the choice of distributions does not make any difference on the 
performance analysis?  
To explore these issues, in the following, Weibull distribution will be applied to the 
analysis using a 12-year-period preventive maintenance policy. The corresponding 
reliability plots acquired using Weibull distribution will be compared to those acquired 
using lognormal distribution with the same preventive maintenance policies to see the 
effects of different choices of distributions. 
As can be seen from the figure below (Figure 47) that the policy to replace the 
system every 12 years decreases the probability that the system is in failure state (both 
catastrophic and noncatastrophic failures, i.e. 3 4 and P P ) every 12 years. And the 
probability that the system is in preventive maintenance state ( 2P ) increases 
correspondingly. Before the preventive maintenance occurs, the probability that the 
system is in failure state increase as the system ages. Hence the maintenance policy 
enhanced the system reliability performance. 
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Figure 47. States probability plots using Weibull distribution with Tr=12 
The reliability plots acquired using Weibull distribution are compared to those 
acquired using lognormal distribution with the same preventive maintenance policy 
( 12
r
T = ) in Figure 48. A rough look at the figures gives the impression that there is no 
prominent differences for state probability plots, between using the Weibull and the 
lognormal distributions, especially in probability plots for state 1 (running state) and 
state 2 (preventive maintenance state). This is understandable from the plots of Figure 46 
because the probability density functions (pdf) and the cumulative distribution functions 
(cdf) plots using the parameters acquired from the failure data with lognormal 
distribution and Weibull distribution are almost identical. Therefore it can be foreseen 
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that the state probability plots overlap a lot with, only negligible differences. However, 
there are notable differences between the two plots for both state 3 (noncatastrophic 
failure state) and state 4 (catastrophic failure state); more details of these are shown in 
the plots of Figure 49 and Figure 50. 
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Figure 48. States probability plots comparison with Tr=12 
 
Figure 49 shows the state probability plot for 3P  (noncatastrophic failure) which is 
an enlarged version of the plot for 3P  in Figure 48. From this plot we can see that 
although the noncatastrophic failure plots using the two different distributions are almost 
the same, there are some notable differences. The difference in the plots is because of the 
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different probability density values and different failure rates (hazard rates) for the two 
distributions at the same given time. However, as we compared the difference between 
the two, it is easy to see that the difference is so small (around 10-3) that we sometimes 
can ignore it when doing reliability analysis such as PRA and GRA. 
















Figure 49. Probability plots of noncatastrophic failures 
 
Similarly, Figure 50 shows the state probability plot for 4P  (catastrophic failure) 
which is an enlarged figure for 4P  in Figure 48. Again, here we see a lot of similarities, 
and some differences. The shape of the catastrophic failure curve is almost the same as 
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that for the noncatastrophic failures, because of the assumed constant (95-5 percent) split 
between the two. 
 



















Figure 50. Probability plots of catastrophic failures 
 
From the preceding analysis, we can see that a proper preventive maintenance can 
enhance the system reliability performance and hence decrease the probability that the 
system is in failure state (noncatastrophic and catastrophic failure). However, as the 
system ages, doing preventive maintenance at a very long period (for example, 20 years 
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for this problem) does not help a lot in enhancing the reliability performance, as it is 
almost surely certain the system will fail before maintenance is performed.. 
As far as the choice of parametric form for the underlying failure distribution is 
concerned, even the analysis done in Chapter IV suggests that lognormal distribution is 
preferred to Weibull distribution, however, no matter whether Weibull or lognormal 
distribution is applied in the reliability analysis, no major differences are found for the 
reliability plots (state probability plots) for the preventive maintenance polices tested 
( 12,15, 20 and 
r
T = ∞ , only 12
r
T =  is shown in the plots, others give similar results).  
Therefore, we can use both distributions in the analysis to this system. 
Considering only reliability performance, one may prefer the shortest preventive 
maintenance period because of the low failure probabilities. However, cost/revenue is 
affected by maintenance policies and hence connected to the reliability performance 
corresponding to those policies. For example, comparing to the 6-year-period 
maintenance policy (as shown in Figure 43) to the 12-year-maintenance policy (as 
shown in Figure 42), the former has a better reliability performance because the 
preventive maintenance successfully prevents the aging effects before they take effect, 
but the related maintenance cost would be more than that of the latter.  
Therefore, when making decisions regarding maintenance and repair policies, 
multiple factors such as reliability, availability, risk/safety, cost and revenue should all 
be taken into account. In the following section, an economic-related cost-benefit analysis 
will be done for different maintenance policies, and the related reliability/availability 
performance, as regards the main generator system in nuclear power plants. 
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5.4 Financial Related Analysis of the System 
System reliability performance, such as failure probabilities and system 
availabilities, can sometimes be used as important input for decision-making processes, 
especially for PRA and GRA analysis. However, when it comes to the plant management 
level, not only the reliability performance, but also the financial performance is used as 
merit-of-comparison. In the present section, a financial analysis is carried out, as an 
adjunct to maintenance decisions for plant management. The expected (mean) net 
present value (NPV) cost is used as the figure of merit in comparing different preventive 
maintenance policies. Also the variance and skewness related to each policy are given as 
supplemental information for the decision making process. 
To begin with, financial parameters related to each state (operation, preventive 
maintenance and failures) must be determined, based on some assumptions for NPP 
operation. 
Consider a NPP with designed power generation capacity of 1200MW per unit. The 
expected market electricity price is around $40/MW, and we will consider the net 
present values (NPV) cost for the NPP with fifty years of operation.  
When the system is in the operating state, the NPP generates electricity at full 
capacity and the utility sells the electricity at market price to make profit. The cost 
associated with the normally operating state can be divided into two major parts: fuel 
cost and O&M (Operation and Maintenance) cost. Hence the net profit for the operation 
state (state 1) can be expressed as: 
 Re   Re - ( &     )Net venue Power Generation venue O M Cost Fuel Cost= +  
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For states other than the operating state, when the main generator is offline due to 
maintenance or failure, there is no electricity generation and therefore no profit from the 
power generation. However, the utility needs to purchase electricity from other sources, 
such as a coal-fired power plant, to ensure normal electricity supply to its customers. 
Here we make an assumption that when the nuclear utility purchases electricity from 
elsewhere, the utility sells it at the same price and hence does not make any profit out of 
it. Therefore, when the system is offline, there is only cost related to that state. In general, 
there is no fuel cost when the system is offline, hence we have the cost in the following 
three parts: O&M (Operation and Maintenance) cost, cost of extra engineers and 
craftsmen cost for repair and maintenance, and the corresponding components and 
materials cost. Since the extra crafts and engineers cost can be grouped in the O&M cost, 
we have only two sources of cost when the system is in a non-operational state (PM state, 
noncatastrophic state and catastrophic state): O&M cost (including the extra engineers 
and crafts cost, varies for different states) related to that state and the corresponding 
components and materials cost. 
To take into account the needs of extra personnel, when the system is in each non-
operational state, other than the basic O&M cost, an adjustment factor ( iα  for state i) is 
applied to each state to accommodate the actual cost associated with that state. Here we 
use the O&M cost for operational state (State 1) as the base cost.  When the system is in 
preventive maintenance state (State 2), because the maintenance is planned and the 
components can be pre-ordered, the extra O&M cost will be less than the cost when the 
system is in a catastrophic failure state (State 4), but the O&M cost must be higher than 
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a noncatastrophic failure (State 3) due to the urgent needs of system recovery. Hence the 
adjustment factor assumed here for state 2 is 2 1/ 5α = . The adjustment factors for state 3 
and state 4 are taken as 3 41/ 6, 1/ 4α α= = respectively. 
For components and materials cost associated with each non-operational state, the 
following assumptions are made: When the system is in preventive maintenance state 
(state 2), the cost of purchasing components and materials is $10,000,000. When the 
system is in a noncatastrophic failure, the cost related to that is $5,000,000 because it is 
relatively easy to recover from that state. For recovery from catastrophic failure, due to 
the necessity for rush orders to avoid long waiting time for components and materials, 
the cost is more significant; it is taken here as $20,000,000 for the duration of recovery. 
From the assumptions in the previous sections, we have different maintenance/repair 
duration for each of the non-operational state, hence the corresponding yearly 
components and material cost for each non-operational state can be calculated by: 
( &  ) (   ) /(  )i i iC M Cost Cost per duration Duration Time=  
Hence the yearly components and materials cost for the three non-operational states 
are as in the following table (Table 18): 
 
Table 18  
Components and materials cost for the three non-operational states 
State No. 2 3 4 
Recovery time (year) 0.3 0.2 0.8 
Cost per duration (Mil. $) 10 5 20 
Annual cost 33.33 25 25 
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 Therefore, the total cost for the three non-operational states can be expressed using 
the following equation: 
(  ) ( &  ) ( &  )
( &  ) (  &  ) (1 )
i i i
i i
Total Cost C M Cost O M Cost
C M Cost Base O M Cost α
= +
= + × +
 
Hence, we have the general equation for the calculation of net profit/cost for each 
state as follows: 
(  Re ) (  Re ) - (  )
-( &  ) - (  &  ) (1 )
i i i
i i
Net venue Generation venue Fuel Cost




Based on the above analysis, we can calculate the net revenue/cost for each of the 
four states. Detailed revenue/cost balance table can be found in Appendix E. The 
numbers used in the calculations are based on discussion with NPP personnel. Table 19 
below shows the total annual net revenue/cost for all states: 
 
Table 19  
Annual net revenue/cost for all states 
State No. 1 2 3 4 
Duration Time (year) N/A 0.3 0.2 0.8 
O&M Cost adjustment 0 1/5 1/6 1/4 
Generation Revenue (Mil. $) 420.48 0 0 0 
Fuel Cost (Mil. $) 36.50 0 0 0 
O&M Cost (Mil. $) 146.00 175.20 170.33 182.5 
C&M Cost (Mil. $) N/A 33.33 25.00 25.00 
Net Profit/Cost (Mil. $) 237.98 -208.53 -195.33 -207.50 
 
 
   
145 
As mentioned in Chapter III, “minimizing the cost” is often the stated objective of 
analyses in industry. In this chapter, the application of entry-time analysis to support 
such an objective (i.e. minimizing the cost) will be illustrated, for PM policies relative to 
the main generator system.  Although the focus here will be on minimizing cost, in 
accord with the industry norm, we still begin with a revenue calculation, to indicate how 
the two formulations are related. 
From the results of the reliability analysis of the preceding section, we already know 
the state probabilities for the system, at any given time t, within the initial 50 years of 
operation. Therefore, the annual state probabilities can be calculated by integrating the 
state probabilities over each year. Once we have the state probabilities ( )iP t  for all four 
states over 50 years, using the net profit/cost data ( iR ) given in the table above (Table 
19), the expected value of the annualized net revenue, the annualized standard deviations 
and skewnesses are calculated using the formulas for same that are given in Section 3.3. 
The Entry-time approach produces precisely discrete approximations to the 
probabilities ( )iP t .  The time stream of expected net revenues plotted in Figure 51 were 
produced by using the finite-difference methodology and the failure rates acquired from 
the analysis in Section 4.3, with time step 0.1 years, and then evaluating the rightmost 
integrals by means of the trapezoidal rule.  Refinement to a step size of 0.05 years in the 
entry-time calculation produced relatively minor changes in the computed values. 
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Figure 51. Comparison of financial parameters for different PM policies 
 
The first overall observation is that expected net revenues for this system are 
typically rather large and that the system has some degree of uncertainty in financial 
performance, as there are periods during which the standard deviation (variance) in 
annualized net revenue tends to have values of the same order as the expected net 
revenues, especially when maintenance is done to the system more frequently (for 
examples, 6
r
T =  years).  Further, the large negative values of skewness indicate that 
much of the variance is located along a long left tail of the underlying distribution; i.e., 
the business is subject to a substantial downside risk. 
   
147 
The most aggressive of the three preventive maintenance policies described, a 
replacement period of 6 years (PM cycle of 6 years), substantially reduces this downside 
risk as can be seen from the “skewness” plot in Figure 51.  
This shortest of the three replacement periods considered is therefore perhaps most 
likely to be adopted by concerns that are strongly risk averse.  However, the graph of 
expected net revenue shows that this decrease in downside risk is purchased at a cost of 
some 10-15% reduction in expected net revenue, depending upon the year.  Management 
more inclined toward (financial, not safety) risk might be inclined to adopt other 
maintenance policies expected to provide more revenue, while still maintaining the 
safety goal. 
As compared to this other replacement periods, the most passive replacement policy 
of “run-to-failure” (i.e. never do preventive maintenance to the system) provides no 
advantage in either expected net revenue or reduction in downside risk.  In fact, the run-
to-failure policy has the “most negative” skewness comparing to other policies and 
hence has the most significant downside risk. Taking into account both financial and 
reliability considerations, the run-to-failure policy seems unlikely to be adopted by 
informed plant management teams. 
More detailed analysis is done to the system based on cost associated with each state. 
From the way the profit is defined (Profit = Generation Revenue - Cost), it is clear that 
any loss of production should be considered as part of the loss in cost calculation. This 
can be seen from the basic algebra shown below: 
1 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4Profit = (G - C ) + (0 - C ) + (0 - C ) + (0 - C ) = G - C - C - C - C  
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where G1 is the generation risk cost from when the system is in state 1 (normal operation 
state) and Ci is the expected value of the actual cost associated to state i.  
Here we define the effective cost for any non-operational state to include the power 
generation loss in the following way: (  ) ,   2,3, 4i i iEffective Cost C G i= + = , hence the 
total annual cost is: 
1 2 2 3 3 4 4
2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 1 2 3 4
Cost = C + (C + G ) + (C + G ) + (C + G )
= G + G + G + C + C + C + C
= G- (G - C - C - C - C ) 
 
where G=G1+G2+G3+G4 is the total annual revenue without any cost which is a 
constant value. 
From the above equation, we can see that when the cost is defined in the way such 
that any production loss is also counted as part of the lost, then the maximizing profit 
strategy is equivalent to the minimizing cost strategy. And such calculations can also be 
carried by using the entry-time approach. The corresponding effective cost rates of the 
various states are given in Table 20. (In comparing these rates for States 3 and 4, note 
that while the cost rates are similar, the cost of a catastrophic failure is larger because 
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Table 20  
Annual effective costs associated with each state 
State No. 1 2 3 4 
Generation Loss (Mil. $) 0 420.48 420.48 420.48 
Fuel Cost (Mil. $) 36.50 0 0 0 
O&M Cost (Mil. $) 146.00 175.20 170.33 182.5 
C&M Cost (Mil. $) N/A 33.33 25.00 25.00 
Cost (Mil. $) 182.50 629.01 615.81 627.98 
 
 
Similar to the revenue calculations, using the effective cost data given in the table 
above (Table 20), the expected value of the effective costs, and the annualized standard 
deviations and skewnesses are calculated. Also the expected values of the net present 
values (NPV) of effective costs were calculated for each preventive maintenance policy, 














where ( )nF  is the revenue at nth year,  and ( )nP  is the present value corresponded to the 
revenue at the nth year ( ( )nF ). Further, fi  is the inflation-adjusted interest rate which has 
included the effects of real interest rate (i) and the inflation rate (f). The relationship of 
the three is defined as 
fi i f if= + +  [35]. 
Hence the net present value (NPV) over N years can be expressed as: 
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Please note there that constant interest rate and constant inflation rate are applied to 
the calculation. The values for the rates were taken as 5%i =  and 2.5%f = respectively 
by referring the most recent government data [36]. Therefore the inflation-adjusted 
interest rate is 7.63%fi = . 
Using the parameters defined and the equations given above, the expected NPV cost 
can be calculated for the 50 year plant life.  The corresponding results are given in Table 
21. From the expected NPV cost values in this table, one can see that the maintenance 
policy of replacing the system every 10 years ( 10
r
T =  years) brings the minimum 
expected net present value effective cost to the NPP. The more aggressive maintenance 
and dense preventive maintenance cost of replacing the system every 6 years ( 6
r
T =  
years) brings the largest expected net present value cost to the NPP. Some risk-adverse 
people in the management may prefer a shorter maintenance policy to get the best 
system reliability performance; however, in reality they have to take into account the 
financial performance in order to minimize the net cost while still meeting the 
safety/reliability requirements, which is especially true for the current commercial 
nuclear power plants in operation. Therefore, a balance of reliability/risk and net cost is 
often needed when making maintenance decisions in commercial nuclear power plants. 
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Table 21  
NPV cost for all the PM policies over 50 years 
PM (Years) 6 10 12 16 20 Never 
NPV (Mil.) 2306.4 2243.1 2258.9 2277.8 2277.6 2271.6 
 
 
Figure 52 shows the plot of NPV cost over 50 years, for different maintenance 
policies. It is easy to see from the figure that the minimum value of the expected NPV 
effective cost would be acquired when 
r
T  is close to 10
r
T =  years. i.e., with a preventive 
maintenance policy to replace the system every N years where 6 12N< < , we should 
expect to see the minimum NPV cost for 50 years. 
Detailed analysis was done using preventive maintenance policy of replacing the 
system every N years where 6 12N< < . Table 22 shows the expected value of NPV 
effective cost results corresponding to all the preventive maintenance policies. Also the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf), survival functions at the time of preventive 
maintenance are given to demonstrate the reliability performance for that particular 
maintenance policy. The average skewness is also given to help understand the financial 
performance of each maintenance policy and help make maintenance decisions as regard 
to when the best period is to replace the system. 
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Figure 52. Comparison of expected value of NPV cost over 50 years plant life, for 
different maintenance policies 
 
Table 22  
NPV for all the PM policies over 50 years using lognormal distribution 
PM 
(Years) 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 16 20 Never 
NPV 
(Mil.) 2306.4 2276.3 2255.2 2244.0 2243.1 2249.2 2258.9 2277.8 2277.6 2271.6 
cdf 2.5e-4 0.0033 0.0200 0.0707 0.1715 0.3171 0.4823 0.9165 0.9936 1.0000 
Survival 
function 0.9998 0.9967 0.9800 0.9293 0.8285 0.6829 0.5177 0.0835 0.0064 0.0000 
Average 
Skewness 2.2271 2.3750 2.6159 2.9064 3.0312 2.5763 1.7460 1.0821 1.3210 1.6200 
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From Table 22, we can see that the survival function at the time of preventive 
maintenance decreases as the maintenance period increases. The average skewness value 
increases first as the time for preventive maintenance increases from Tr=6 years to Tr=10 
years and then decreases as the maintenance period increases, and there is a slightly 
change after Tr=16 years. A detailed analysis of the variation in skewness and survival 
function will be given later in this section. 
 




















Figure 53.  Detailed comparison of NPV of 50 years for different maintenance policies 
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Figure 53 shows the expected net present values of the effective costs, from using 
different maintenance policies over a 50-years lifetime. As mentioned before, the 
minimum expected net present value effective cost ocurs for maintenance periods 
somewhere between 6 years and 12 years. The plot above shows that the minimum net 
present value cost comes with the maintenance policy to replace the system every 10 
years (Tr=10 years). However, the difference in NPVs for Tr=10 years and Tr=9 years is 
not significant, as seen from Table 22  and Figure 53. Based only on NPV effective cost, 
one may prefer to choose the maintenance policy to replace the system every 10 years 
(Tr=10 years) which minimize the NPV cost for a 50 year lifetime. Again, back to the 
original goal of the maintenance of a commercial nuclear power plant, we want to 
minimize the cost (represented by expected NPV effective cost in this example) while 
still having acceptable reliability performance. Hence more analysis needs to be done 
and more performance needs to be compared in order to make final maintenance 
decisions. In the following, the NPV cost and the survival function as well as the average 
skewness will be plotted together to give us a better understanding of both the financial 
performance and the risk/reliability performance for each preventive maintenance policy.  
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NPV (Mil.) Survial Function
 
Figure 54. NPV and survival function of 50 years for different maintenance policies 
 
From the plot above (Figure 54), we can see that the survival function decreases as 
the maintenance period increases. When the NPV cost reaches its minimum at 10
r
T = , 
the survival function takes the value of 0.8285 and hence the corresponding cdf value for 
failure is 0.1715, which means that the cumulative failure probability at the time when 
preventive maintenance is done is slightly more than 17% and therefore the cumulative 
survival probability is somewhat less than 83%. For risk-averse management, that might 
be a very high detriment to choosing such a large replacement period. For maintenance 
policies 9
r
T = , 10
r
T = and 11
r
T = , the NPV cost for these three maintenance policies 
are $2244.0M, $2243.1M and $2249.2 respectively, hence there are only small 
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differences among the three NPV values; however, the cumulative survival probability 
values for the three policies are 0.9293, 0.8285 and 0.6829 and the difference between 
the former two values is 0.1008. That means the cumulative probability of failure 
increases about 10% if we choose the maintenance policy of replacing the system every 
10 years ( 10
r
T = ) instead of replacing it every 9 years ( 9
r
T = ). This 10% increase is 
generally regarded as very large number in reliability analysis, especially for 
generation/risk related systems such as the main generators.  
Since there is no significant difference between the NPV cost acquired using the two 
different maintenance policies ( 9
r
T = and 10
r
T = ), while there is big difference in the 
reliability performance, the one with better reliability performance will tend to be 
preferred. Hence, if we want to choose between the two maintenance policies, 9
r
T =  is 
probably preferable to 10
r
T =  because of its high reliability performance and low NPV 
cost value, provided the a cumulative failure value of 7% (the cdf for 9
r
T =  is 0.0707 )is 
acceptable. 
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Figure 55. NPV and average skewness of 50 years for different maintenance policies 
 
In addition to the comparison of cumulative failure values and the cumulative 
survival function values, the average skewness values over the 50 year life also can be 
compared, so as to assist the decision-making process as to which maintenance policy is 
preferable.  Figure 55 shows the NPV cost and the corresponding average skewness 
values for each maintenance policy. As can be seen from Figure 55 the magnitude of the 
skewness value increases as the maintenance period increases from 6 years to 10 years 
and then decreases as we increase the maintenance period to 11 years or above. However, 
when the maintenance is longer than 16 years, there is a slight increase in the skewness 
value, as the expected NPV effective cost starts to decrease. These two phenomena are 
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believed to be closely related in the sense that when choosing among the last three 
maintenance policies (Tr=16 years to Tr=20 years and never do PM), the run-to-failure 
policy (never do PM) is preferred because it has a relatively smaller NPV cost. 
Similarly, in comparing the two different maintenance policies 9
r
T = and 10
r
T = , 
there is again no huge difference between the expected NPV cost achieved, and also 
there is no big difference in the average skewness. The average skewness values are 
2.9064 and 3.0312 respectively. Hence, if we want to choose between these two 
maintenance policies based on the comparison of skewness values, even though 10
r
T =  
is more preferable to 9
r
T =  because of it has larger positive skewness; however, the 
difference is small, so there is room for different philosophies without greatly affecting 
either expected NPV cost or downside risk. Still it is too hard to make judgment because 
the difference is almost negligible. 
From this discussion we draw the following conclusion: Considering the 
requirement to minimize the NPV cost and still get a good reliability performance, if we 
want to choose between the two maintenance policies 9
r
T =  and 10,
r
T =  then 9
r
T =  is  
preferable to 10
r
T =  because it has higher reliability performance (with cumulative 
survival probability of  0.9293) and smaller NPV cost value, and it also has  roughly the 
same skewness number as does 10
r
T = . However, the conclusion is based on the 
assumption that the cumulative failure value of 7% (the cdf for 9
r
T =  is 0.0707) is 
acceptable to plant management. It is possible that plant management judges the value of 
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7% is too high for the consideration of risk/reliability. In that scenario, a shorter 
maintenance policy such as 7
r
T = or 8
r
T = may even be considered. 
As has been discussed in the preceding section, the probability density functions 
(pdf) and the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) plots using the parameters acquired 
from the failure data with lognormal distribution and Weibull distribution are almost 
identical (Figure 46). The only difference between the two distributions is the hazard 
rate (failure rate), as shown in plot at the lower right of Figure 46.   Also, from the 
analysis done in the preceding section, we know that the reliability performances using 
the two distributions are roughly the same with slightly differences. 
However, when it comes to the system financial performance analysis, one may ask 
which distribution is preferable, lognormal distribution or Weibull distribution, or indeed 
if the choice of distributions makes little or any difference in the financial performance 
analysis?  
 
Table 23  
Comparison of expected NPV cost for all the PM policies over 35 years 
PM (Years) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Never 
NPV(Weibull) 
(Mil. $) 2186.6 2156.9 2140.7 2123.9 2118.0 2117.6 2116.9 2129.1 
NPV(lognormal) 
(Mil. $) 2184.9 2153.7 2136.9 2120.3 2117.6 2120.1 2121.2 2127.7 
cdf(Weibull) 0.0076 0.0196 0.0441 0.0890 0.1633 0.2744 0.4220 1 
cdf(lognormal) 2.5e-4 0.0033 0.0200 0.0707 0.1715 0.3171 0.4823 1 
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As has been done in the preceding section, the financial performances will now be 
compared using the Weibull and lognormal distributions. To see only the effects of the 
two distributions in the calculation of NPV and hence the analysis of financial 
performances, a plant life of only 35 years is used rather than 50 years. 
The expected NPV of the costs of each maintenance policy using the two 
distributions are given in Table 23. A rough observation of the numbers shows that no 
matter which distribution is used, the minimum expected NPV costs occurs at 10
r
T =  
years.  A detailed comparison of the expected NPV costs shows that the minimum NPV 
costs from the two distributions are roughly the same ($2118.0M for Weibull and 
$2117.6M for lognormal). Also a comparison of the corresponding cdf values from the 
two distributions shows that they are roughly the same, with difference of around 1% for 
9
r
T =  years and 10
r
T = years. 
Figure 56 gives a better of view of the comparison of NPV values. It is clear to see 
from this figure that the expected NPV cost attains its minimum at 10,
r
T =  for both 
distributions. Also the increasing/deceasing trends of the two tend to be the same: 
Expected NPV cost decreases with a PM period shorter than 10 years and increases 
afterwards with a longer PM period. However, a detailed comparison shows some 
significant differences in the NPV values, especially for 9
r
T =  years and 11
r
T =  years. 
For NPV values acquired using lognormal distribution, the NPV for 9
r
T =  tends to be 
smaller than that of 11
r
T = . On the other hand, for expected NPV cost obtained using the 
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Weibull distribution, it is the opposite; expected NPV cost for 9
r
T =  is larger than that 
for 11
r




















Figure 56.  NPV costs for 35 years plant life, for different maintenance policies and 
different failure distributions 
 






















Figure 57. Comparison of expected NPV costs for 35 year plant life, different 
maintenance policies, and different failure distributions 
 
The trends of expected NPV costs for both distributions are shown in Figure 57. As 
can be clearly seen from the figure, the expected NPV cost acquired using the lognormal 
distribution tends to be less than that acquired using Weibull distribution, for 
replacement periods less than 10
r
T =  years. Further, the expected NPV costs at 10
r
T =  
for the two distributions are almost the same. After that point ( 10
r
T =  years), the 
expected NPV cost acquired using Weibull distribution tends to be less than that 
acquired using lognormal distribution. This is easy to understand from the cdf and pdf 
plots for the two distributions, as can be found in Figure 46.  That is, both cdf and pdf 
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values for the failures tend to be greater for Weibull distribution that those from 
lognormal distribution when 10t < years and the trends become opposite afterwards.  
This means that the probability of system failure tends to be larger using Weibull 
distribution when 10t < years, hence the expected NPV cost found using Weibull 
distribution is larger due to the higher failure costs. Similarly the NPV obtained using 
lognormal distribution is larger than that from the Weibull distribution, when 
10
r
T > years. 
When it comes making a decision as to which maintenance policy is better, from 
both reliability and financial point of view, 9
r
T = years is chosen as well when Weibull 
distribution instead of lognormal distribution is used in the analysis. This is because  
9
r
T = years provides a high reliability performance (with cumulative survival 
probability of 0.9110 while the value for 10
r
T = years is 0.8367), and small expected 
NPV cost as well. 
From the analysis done in this and the previous sections, we draw the following 
conclusion for the maintenance of the main generator system: 
i. The reliability performance of the main generator system tends to be better 
with a shorter maintenance period. 
ii. The financial performance (expected NPV cost) tends to be better when the 
replacement period is close to 10
r
T =  years, but this minimum is relatively 
broad in that the associated expected NPV cost changes relatively little for 
changes of  Tr on the order of a year or so. 
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iii. Considering the requirement to minimize the NPV cost and still get a better 
reliability performance, if we want to choose between the two maintenance 
policies, 9
r
T =  years is preferable to 10
r
T =  years, because it has high 
reliability performance (with cumulative survival probability of  0.9293) and 
only a very slightly larger expected NPV cost.  It also has large positive 
skewness which brings good financial performance as well. 
iv. The above conclusions are largely independent, from the perspective of both 
reliability performance and financial performance, of whether one uses the 
Weibull or lognormal distribution. The choice of distribution has little effect 
on the analysis of the system, and hence little effect on the selection of the 
preferred maintenance policy. 
5.5 Applications of Entry-time Processes in PRA/GRA 
From the preceding sections of this chapter we can see that entry-time processes can 
be applied to PM-based issues and to help make maintenance decisions from the aspects 
of both reliability and financial performance. Another possible application of the entry-
time approach is to incorporate time-dependent failure rates, especially aging effects and 
maintenance policies, into PRA/GRA.  
It is clear that system reliability performance measures such as failure probabilities 
and system availabilities can sometimes be used as important input for decision-making 
process, especially for PRA and GRA analyses. However, in classic PRA, constant 
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failure rates are applied to the fault tree and event tree analysis, and therefore aging 
effects and maintenance policies are not taken into account.  
There is already some work done (for example, [17]) to incorporate aging effects 
into PRA, as introduced in the first chapter of the dissertation. However, the entry-time 
processes provide a different methodology at the system level that can generates time-
dependent probabilities for the system as a whole. Also, entry-time processes allow 
time-dependent transition rates, which can include not only aging effects, but also time-
dependent maintenance policies. 
For the generator system discussed above, if we use the constant failure rate 
assumption as is being used in the current NPP PRA/GRA models when doing future 
reliability performance predictions, we would have a much lower failure probability (in 
state 3 and state 4) after around 5 years. 
One may argue that the Bayesian updating [37] often used in analyzing reliability 
for NPPs accounts in some way for failure rate changes from past operational experience. 
Nonetheless, the associated drawback is that the PRA calculation of cdf, which is 
supposed to forecast the likelihood, actually only reflects the present experience. The 
associated shortcoming stems from the fact that in NPPs most PRA/GRA models are 
used not only for reflecting the current system status, but also for predicting the future 
system reliability performance so as to make adequate management decisions. For the 
most part, management decisions are made from the viewpoint of long-term system 
reliability rather than short-term performance, which requires not just consideration of 
past experience, but also consideration of system performance as it ages. 
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Consider a common scenario in a GRA model, for the above main generator system. 
In a typical GRA fault tree logic, the failure of a generator will lead directly to one of the 
tops of the fault tree (100% power loss). Without considering preventive maintenance, 
after 5 years the difference between a constant failure rate GRA model and a time-
dependent failure rate model will be more than 2%. That amounts to a huge difference 
(up to 200MWe) in the generation loss calculation for a nuclear power plant with two 
1200MW units. 
Another advantage of this model is that not only aging effects are considered in the 
dynamic calculation, but also different preventive maintenance policies are integrated. 
The incorporation of entry-time processes with PRA/GRA models would not only permit 
the inclusion of aging effects, but also provide a methodology for evaluating the benefits 
of maintenance in controlling aging. 




The entry-time model was developed, assessed and applied to a case study for 
maintenance of main generator in nuclear power plants in the preceding chapters. The 
data and methodology issues are also addressed in the discussion. 
In this chapter, the work is summarized to give a brief overview of the model and its 
applications in Section 6.1. Also the future research and application directions are 
discussed in Section 6.2.  
6.1 Summary of the Work 
The research has developed, assessed and demonstrated the applicability of a novel 
reliability methodology, centered about what we term as “entry-time processes,” that has 
the potential to provide a significantly greater range of applicability and flexibility than 
traditional reliability tools for case studies related to equipment and components in 
nuclear power plants. 
It has been shown that the entry-time methodology has particular potential for 
incorporation into case studies supporting plant planning, and related case studies, 
including such matters as the effects of component aging and the scheduling of 
inspections, tests and planned preventive maintenance activities. The potential for this 
type of application can only be further enhanced by what appears to be a movement 
toward obtaining improved estimates of equipment failure rates through first-principles 
consideration of the underlying causes of failure. 
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In this work, the entry-time model is defined and the integro-differential equations 
and its discrete algorithm are developed in the second chapter. In the third chapter, this 
discrete algorithm is verified by some analytically solvable hypothetical examples and 
by comparison to results from simulation. After that (Chapter III), the entry-time 
approach is applied to a real field NPP application, in a RIAM-based scenario.  This 
application is based on data from the INPO-EPIX database (Sections 5.3 and 5.4) and 
followed by a discussion of possible applications of the entry-time approach to PRA and 
GRA model in NPP (Section 5.5). Also the applicability of the EPIX database is proved 
(In Chapter IV). 
6.2 Future Research/Application Directions 
As mentioned in the third chapter, further research needs to be done to compare the 
accuracy and efficiency of the entry-time methodology against simulations. A detailed 
analysis should be done as part of the future research about the error and “efforts” 
(computational efficiency) of the entry-time methodology and simulation. This is very 
important in choosing the calculation methodology when dealing with some ‘rare event” 
problems. For example, for some catastrophic failure for a risk-related system, the 
probability of such failure is so rare that it is very difficult to capture in a simulation 
calculation, with a feasibly small number of sample paths. However, determination of 
the probability of such events is not particularly stressful for entry-time calculation. This 
could delineate a type of application for which the entry-time methodology has 
substantial advantages over traditional simulation approaches.. 
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When dealing with different failure modes for the same system, when the failures 
are not independent, the “bad as old” assumption, as applied in Section 4.5, is invalid 
because of the data collection mechanism.  Hence one might wish some alternative 
approach.  The “good as new” assumption might be true, but would need to allow for 
infant mortality in the failure mode that was attempted to repair.  An entry time model 
could accommodate that, but would need to allow for multiple entry times, one for each 
failure mode. This could be an important area of future research, when expanding the 
application of entry-time models for other applications. 
One of the most important features of the entry-time approach is the inclusion of 
time-dependent failure rates.  This permits inclusion of infant mortality, aging effects 
and maintenance policies in the analysis. As mentioned Chapter I that one of the 
drawbacks of the classis PRA/GRA models is that only constant failure rates are applied 
when setting up the event trees and fault trees. 
Therefore, with the inclusion of time-dependent failure rates, the entry-time 
approach can be applied to set up dynamic event trees and dynamic fault trees and hence 
to build dynamic PRA/GRA models. 
One possible way of doing that is to apply the entry-time model to a system or 
component where time-dependent failure rates are important, to obtain the dynamic 
reliability performance (such as time-dependent state probabilities) of the 
system/component. Once the state probabilities are acquired from the entry-time 
calculation, the evolution of the “states” can be identified as a function of time and other 
environmental parameters and hence a dynamic event tree for the system/component 
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performance can be set up, based on the results acquired from entry-time analysis. Then 
the dynamic event tree for the system/component can be fit into the comprehensive fault 
tree to construct a dynamic event tree for all systems. Using the same methodology as 
for  constructing the dynamic event tree, the corresponding dynamic fault tree can be set 
up and used for PRA/GRA models and therefore can be used to quantify the dynamic 
performance of the systems. 
Other than dynamic PRA/GRA applications, the entry-time approach can be applied 
mainly to the RIAM applications such as maintenance optimization and 
sensitivity/uncertainty analysis. In this dissertation an illustrative and relatively simple 
application to preventive maintenance decisions was presented. However, depending on 
the requirements of different applications, the general approach can be modified to 
obtain a more detailed analysis of systems or components.  
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APPENDIX A  
SAMPLE FAILURE RECORDS FROM EPIX DATABASE 
The EPIX database is queried using different search criteria to get records for 
component failures, as discussed in Section 4.2. 
After appropriate SQL queries, we can find the following failure records for motors 
from the INPO-EPIX database. The structure of the data records can be seen from the 
following data segment: 
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APPENDIX B  
COMPLETE FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS TO CIRCUIT BREAKERS 
AND MOTORS FOR SECTION 4.2 
The results are shown below as a sequence of plots of data resulting from analyses 
of generators of different model numbers and model types, as discussed in Section 4.2: 
Distribution plots for circuit breakers: 
Model number: DS 206; Type: K: 
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Model number: DS 206; Type: S: 
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Model number: HFB3; Type: K: 
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Model number: HFB3; Type: S: 
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Distribution plots for motors: 
Model number: CS VSS; Type: S: 
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Model number: TBDP; Type: S: 
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Model number: FTYPE AN; Type: S:  
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APPENDIX C  
COMPLETE FAILURE DATA RECORDS FOR MAIN GENERATOR 
(ARBITRARY CENSORING PROCEDURE APPLIED) 
The failure records for main generators manufactured by Westinghouse are queried 
from the EPIX database, as discussed in Section 4.5. The data are then analyzed using 
Mintitab. The following table shows the data used in Minitab using the arbitrary 
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APPENDIX D 
DATA CENSORING METHODS 
The data queried from the database can be interpreted as different observations, as 
discussed in Section 4.4. The different observations correspond to different “censoring 
schemes” in MiniTab. In this appendix, some examples are given to show the 
connections between observations and “censoring schemes” 
In MiniTab, the user can input the data using different “censoring schemes”. Here 
the table below shows how the censoring scheme is related to the observation of data:  
Here Table D-1 shows the different types of observations that are supported by the 
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Table D-1 






You know exactly 
when the failure 
occurred. 
The fan failed at exactly 
500 days. 
Right censored You only know that 
the failure occurred 
after a particular 
time. 
The fan had not yet failed 
at 500 days. 
Left censored You only know that 
the failure occurred 
before a particular 
time. 
The fan failed sometime 
before 500 days. 
Interval censored You only know that 
the failure occurred 
between two 
particular times. 
The fan failed sometime 




From Table D-1, we know we may have different types of observations. Then when 
using the MiniTab software to do reliability analysis to the data, we have different 
censoring methods corresponding to those observations. Table D-2 shows how to input 
the observed data into MiniTab software using different censoring methods (here “*” 
means missing data):  
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Table D-2  
Examples of MiniTab input corresponding to different types of observations: 
Start End    
* 10000 Left censored at 10000 hours. 
10000 20000   
20000 30000   
30000 30000 Exact failures at 30000 hours. 
30000 40000   
40000 50000   
50000 50000   
50000 60000 Interval censored between 
50000 and 60000 hours. 
60000 70000   
70000 80000   
80000 90000   




Table D-3  
Sample failure data (Estimated age at failure) from the EPIX database 
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Here Table D-3 shows some sample failure data acquired from the database.In our 
analysis, we use two different data interpretation schemes in the analysis of the failure 
data. Scheme 1 is “discovery by inspection” in which we assume the failures occurred in 
between two inspections. Hence the MiniTab input data for the above failure records 
(Table D-3) can be found in Table D-4. 
 
Table D-4 

















Method 2 is “discovery by alarm, with no censoring” in which we assume all 
failures are exact, which means they are discovered immediately after the failures. 
Hence the MiniTab input data using this censoring procedure for the above failure 
records (Table D-3) can be found in Table D-5. 
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Table D-5 
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APPENDIX E  
DETAILED COST/REVENUE TABLE (USED IN SECTION 5.2) 
 
Unit Capacity(MW) 1200     
Electricity Price ($/MWh) 40     
Recovery time for PM (Year) 0.3     
Recovery time for N-C failure (Year) 0.2  PM N-C Failure C Failure 
Recovery time for C failure (year) 0.8 O&M Change factor 1/5 1/6 1/4 
 Per day Per Year   
Fuel cost $100,000 $36,500,000   
O&M $400,000 $146,000,000   





 Net Profit $652,000 $237,980,000   
 Per day Per recovery time Per Year  
O&M 480,000 N/A $175,200,000  
Power Generation 0 0 $0  
Components costs N/A 10,000,000 $33,333,333  
 
 
State 2(PM State) 
 
 Net Profit  N/A $(208,533,333.33)  
 Per day Per recovery time Per Year  
O&M 466,667 N/A $170,333,333  
Power Generation 0 0 $0  
Components costs N/A 5,000,000 $25,000,000  
 
 
State 3(Noncatastrophic Failure) 
 
 Net Profit  N/A $(195,333,333.33)  
 Per day Per recovery time Per Year  
O&M 500,000 N/A $182,500,000  
Power Generation 0 0 $0  
Components costs N/A 20,000,000 $25,000,000  
 
 
State 4(Catastrophic Failure) 
 
 Net Profit  N/A $(207,500,000.00)  
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APPENDIX F  
CODES USED IN THE ENTRY-TIME ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN 
GENERATOR RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE IN SECTION 5.3 
Entry_time_Main.m: 
 
%Program Name: Entry_time_Main.m 
%Program function: This is the main entry of the entry-time process code 
%Program NOTE: This is a revision of the initial program 
%Program by: Eric Wang 
%Program Date: 06/01/2007 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Revision History%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Revision Date%%%%%%%Revision reason%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%06/01/2007: Program initial setup 
%07/30/2007: Use this program for the Main Generator Example 
%           This example uses lognormal dis. rather than Weibull Dist. 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%End of Revision History%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Functions List %%%%%%%% 
%Function Name%%%%%%%%%%%Function usage %%%%%%%%%%%% 
%lambda0: Differential transition probability at entry time zero 
%Lambda:  Cumulative transition probability 
% 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%End of Functions List%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Definition of states%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% State 1: System is in normal running state 
%% State 2: System is down for preventive maintenance 
%% State 3: System is down due to non-catastrophic failure 
%% State 4: System is down due to catastrophic failure 
%% Note that: 95% the failure is non-catastrophic and 5% is catastrophic 
home;clear all;close all; 
global I N Delt N_r n_c_nc n_c_c n_p mu sigma beta eta 
Time0=clock; 
disp(sprintf('The program starts at: %s\n',time_display(0))); 
disp(sprintf('Program running, please stand by...\n')); 
Pdiag_Save_name='Pdiag_Save_10';Figure_Name='Plot_10'; 
I=4;    %Number of states 
N=350;   %Number of time stpes 
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Terminal_time=35;    %Termial calendar time 
T_r=15;       % Max time between maintenances 
t_c_nc=0.2;  % Time for non-catastrophic corrective maintenance 
t_c_c=0.8;   % Time for catastrophic corrective maintenance 
t_p=0.4;     % Time for preventive maintenance 





%%%%%%%%%Change the parameters above for 
calculation%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
Delt=Terminal_time/N; %Time step 
N_r=T_r/Delt;     % Max no. of time steps between maintenances 
n_c_nc=t_c_nc/Delt;     % No. of time steps for non-catastrophic CM 
n_c_c=t_c_c/Delt;     % No. of time steps for catastrophic CM 
n_p=t_p/Delt;     % No. of time steps for preventive maintenance 
T=Terminal_time; 
for i=1:I   %Initialize the P matrix: P{i}(m,n)=P_i(m,n) in equations 
    P{i}=zeros(N+1,N+1); 
    P{i}(1,1)=P_ini(i); 
end 
disp(sprintf('Now starting entry-time calculation...\n')); 
for n=1:N       % Calendar time index of probability being computed 
    Time_loop_start=clock; 
    disp(sprintf('Now calculating N=%d, and %d loop(s) remaining...\n',n,N-n)); 
    disp(sprintf('This loop starts at: %s\n',time_display(0))); 
    for m=1:n   % Entry time index of probability being computed 
        for i=1:I   % State index of probability being computed 
            Delp=0; % Initialize transitions from earlier times 
            for j=1:I 
                Delp=Delp+Delt*lambda0(j,i,1,n)*P{i}(1,n); 
            end 
            for mp=1:m-1  % Loop to obtain transitions from all earlier entry times 
                for j=1:I  % Loop over all states, including state being computed 
                    DelLambda=Lambda(j,i,mp,n+1)-Lambda(j,i,mp+1,n+1); 
                    Delp=Delp+(P{i}(mp+1,n)-P{i}(mp,n))*DelLambda; 
                end 
            end 
            P{i}(m,n+1)=P{i}(m,n)-Delp; 
        end 
    end 
    % Calculate next probabilities along diagonal, for all states 
    for i=1:I   % Next diagonal update 
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        Delp1=0; 
        Delp2=0; 
        for j=1:I 
            Delp1=Delp1+Delt*lambda0(i,j,1,n+1)*P{j}(1,n); 
            Delp2=Delp2+Delt*lambda0(j,i,1,n+1)*P{i}(1,n); 
        end 
        for mp=1:m-1 
            for j=1:I 
                DelLambda1=Lambda(i,j,mp,n+1)-Lambda(i,j,mp+1,n+1); 
                DelLambda2=Lambda(j,i,mp,n+1)-Lambda(j,i,mp+1,n+1); 
                Delp1=Delp1+(P{j}(mp+1,n)-P{j}(mp,n))*DelLambda1; 
                Delp2=Delp2+(P{i}(mp+1,n)-P{i}(mp,n))*DelLambda2; 
            end 
        end 
        P{i}(n+1,n+1)=P{i}(n,n)+(Delp1-Delp2); 
    end 
    time_used_loop=etime(clock,Time_loop_start); 
if time_used_loop>60 
    disp_loop_running_time=sprintf('Total time used for the loop is %f minutes\n 
\n',time_used_loop/60); 
else 
    disp_loop_running_time=sprintf('Total time used for the loop is %f seconds\n 
\n',time_used_loop); 
end 

















plot(t,Pdiag{2},'-'); % Probability of second state 
xlabel('Time (years)') 
ylabel('P_2') 















    disp_total_running_time=sprintf('Total time used for the program is %f 
minutes\n',time_used_total/60); 
else 
    disp_total_running_time=sprintf('Total time used for the program is %f 
seconds\n',time_used_total); 
end 






%Program Name: lambda0.m 
%Program function: Subroutine for differential transition probability at 
%entry time zero 
%Program by: Eric Wang 
%Program Date: 06/01/2007 
%%%%%%%%%%%Revision History%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Revision Date%%%%%%%%%Revision reason%%%%%%%%%%% 




%%%%%%%%%%End of Revision History%%%%%%%%% 
%% 
%%%%%%%% Functions List %%%%%%%%%%%%% 
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%%%%%%%%%End of Functions List%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% 
function lambda0=lambda0(i,j,m,n) 
global I N Delt N_r n_c_nc n_c_c n_p mu sigma beta eta 
lambda0=0; 
if i==2&j==1 
    if n-m<=N_r & n-m+1>N_r 
        lambda0=1.0/Delt; 
    end 
elseif i==3&j==1 
    if n>m 
lambda=beta/eta*((n-m)*Delt/eta)^(beta-1)*0.95; 
    end 
elseif i==4&j==1 
    if n>m 
 lambda=beta/eta*((n-m)*Delt/eta)^(beta-1)*0.05; 
    end 
elseif i==1&j==2 
    if n-m<=n_p& n-m+1>n_p 
        lambda0=1.0/Delt; 
    end 
elseif i==1&j==3 
    if n-m<=n_c_nc& n-m+1>n_c_nc 
        lambda0=1.0/Delt; 
    end 
elseif i==1&j==4 
    if n-m<=n_c_c& n-m+1>n_c_c 
        lambda0=1.0/Delt; 







        201  
  
VITA  
Name: Shuwen Wang 
Permanent Address: 3133 TAMU 
            Nuclear Engineering Department 
            Texas A&M University 
            College Station, TX, 77843-3133 
Email: EricXWang@gmail.com 
Education: B.S., Nuclear Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2001 
       M.E., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University, 2005 
       Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University, 2008 
 
 
